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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 1991, a dispute settlement panel of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT)1 concluded that U.S. restrictions on the importation of tuna 
caught by encircling dolphins2 violated the GATT’s prohibition against import 
 
 1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, 
reprinted in BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS [BISD] 4th Supp. 1 (1969) 
[hereinafter GATT 1947]. During the negotiations that established the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), GATT 1947 was amended to replace the phrase “Contracting Parties” with “Members.” 
It is now known as GATT 1994. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade─Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations (The Uruguay Round): Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Dec. 15, 1993, (The Uruguay Round) Doc. MTN/FA, 33 I.L.M. 
1 (1994). 
 2. In the 1970s, more than 400,000 dolphins were dying in tuna nets each year in the 
Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean (ETP).  As a consequence, the United States took action to stop 
this mortality under the U.S. Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA).  16 U.S.C. § 1361 (2000) 
et seq.  The MMPA prohibits the “taking” (harassment, hunting, capture, killing, or attempt 
thereof) and importation into the United States of marine mammals, except where an exception is 
explicitly authorized.  In addition, it seeks to reduce the incidental kill or serious injury of marine 
mammals in the course of commercial fishing to insignificant levels approaching zero.  With 
regard to the ETP tuna fishery, Section 101(a)(2) of the MMPA authorizes limited incidental 
taking of marine mammals by United States fishermen in the course of commercial fishing 
pursuant to a permit issued by the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), in conformity with 
and governed by certain statutory criteria in sections 103 and 104 and implementing regulations.  
At the time Mexico initiated a GATT dispute over these provisions in the late 1980s, only one 
such permit had been issued, to the American Tuna Boat Association, covering all domestic tuna 
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restrictions.3  Not only did the Tuna/Dolphin dispute awaken environmentalists 
to the GATT, but it also galvanized them to try to influence the ongoing 
negotiations among Canada, Mexico and the United States over the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).4 
Environmentalists ultimately succeeded in shaping the debate over how 
NAFTA should address the impacts of trade on the environment.  While 
Canada, Mexico and the United States did not reopen NAFTA to revise the 
substantive rules of trade liberalization, they did successfully negotiate and 
adopt an environmental side agreement formally known as the North American 
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC).5  Two underlying 
concerns animate the NAAEC.  First, environmentalists believed NAFTA 
would have competitiveness effects6—that Mexico’s relatively weak 
enforcement of environmental laws would increase environmentally harmful 
investment in Mexico, thereby creating pollution havens. Second, 
environmentalists worried that trade liberalization generally might impair the 
environment not only in Mexico but throughout North America. 
As a consequence, the NAAEC’s provisions center on mitigating these two 
concerns. To support capacity building in Mexico specifically and to foster 
 
fishing operations in the ETP.  Under the general permit issued to this Association, no more than 
20,500 dolphins could be incidentally killed or injured each year by the U.S. fleet fishing in the 
ETP.  Within this dolphin mortality limit, no more than 250 could be coastal spotted dolphins 
(Stenella attenuata) and no more than 2,750 could be Eastern spinner dolphins (Stenella 
longirostris).  Also at the time of the dispute, Section 101(a)(2) of the MMPA banned the 
importation of commercial fish or fish products caught with commercial fishing technology that 
results in the incidental kill or incidental serious injury of ocean mammals in excess of U.S. 
standards. It specifically prohibited the importation of yellowfin tuna harvested with purse-seine 
nets in the ETP unless the Secretary of Commerce certified that (1) the government of the 
harvesting country has a program regulating the taking of marine mammals that is comparable to 
that of the United States, and (2) the average rate of incidental taking of marine mammals by 
vessels of the harvesting nation is comparable to, but must not exceed 1.25 times, the average rate 
of such taking by U.S. vessels during the same period. 
 3. Report of the Panel, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT, DS21/R 
(Sept. 3, 1991) (unadopted), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991) (Tuna/Dolphin I).  In a later 
dispute, a panel ruled that U.S. restrictions on tuna imported from countries that had previously 
imported tuna from countries that caught tuna by encircling dolphins also violated Article XI of 
the GATT.  Report of the Panel, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT, DS29/R 
(June 16, 1994) (unadopted), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 839 (1994) (Tuna/Dolphin II). 
 4. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 296 
(1993), 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993), reprinted in International Legal Materials 32:296, 32:605 (1993) 
[hereinafter NAFTA].  NAFTA was implemented in the United States through Pub. L. No. 103-
182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993). 
 5. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Sept. 14, 
1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480 [hereinafter NAAEC]. The NAAEC is not technically an international 
treaty, which required Senate ratification.  Instead, it was enacted through an Executive Order of 
the President.  Exec. Order No. 12,915, 59 Fed. Reg. 25,775 (May 18, 1994). 
 6. For a more complete discussion of competitiveness effects, see infra Section II.A. 
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protection of the entire North American environment, the NAAEC encourages 
cooperation among the Parties.  It does so principally by creating a new 
international institution, the Commission for Environmental Cooperation 
(CEC), designed not only to address trade-environment linkages but also to 
coordinate environmental policy throughout North America.7  It also 
establishes a Secretariat to help the Parties implement a cooperative 
environmental work program.8  The Secretariat also has independent authority 
to prepare reports on matters within the scope of the cooperative work program 
without the need for governmental approval.9 To prevent competitiveness 
effects, the NAAEC requires Parties to ensure high levels of environmental 
protection and to effectively enforce their environmental laws.10  The 
Secretariat also has the duty to investigate citizen allegations that a Party is 
failing to effectively enforce environmental law.11  The NAAEC also includes 
a government process that envisages sanctions against a Party for a “persistent 
failure” to enforce environmental law effectively.12 As the first agreement to 
address environmental issues within the context of a trade agreement, the 
NAAEC has been widely hailed as innovative.13 
This initial achievement to include environmental provisions as part of a 
free trade agreement, however, has masked the NAAEC’s relatively modest 
achievements and impaired the creation of more suitable institutions and 
mechanisms to address trade-environment linkages based on the lessons 
learned from the NAAEC.  First, the NAAEC’s cooperative program has 
achieved some compelling environmental successes, such as providing 
substantial training to Mexican environmental officials and eliminating the use 
of dangerous pesticides, including chlordane and DDT.14 Nonetheless, the 
CEC remains woefully underfunded at $9 million per triennium, limiting 
cooperation among the Parties. Second, due to the focus on competitiveness 
effects, the NAAEC has fallen short of addressing more pressing trade-
environment issues, particularly scale effects, which are the environmental 
 
 7. NAAEC, supra note 5, art.10. 
 8. Id. arts. 11(5)–(6). 
 9. Id. art. 13. 
 10. Id. arts. 3, 5. 
 11. Id. arts. 14–15. 
 12. NAAEC, supra note 5, arts. 22–36. 
 13. See, e.g., John H. Knox & David L. Markell, The Innovative North American 
Commission for Environmental Cooperation, in GREENING NAFTA: THE NORTH AMERICAN 
COMMISSION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 2 (David L. Markell & John H. Knox, eds., 
2003) (“[The NAAEC] has innovative tools and almost unlimited jurisdiction to address regional 
environmental problems.  And it provides unprecedented opportunities for participation by civil 
society.”). 
 14. See infra Section III.B. 
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impacts resulting from trade liberalization.15  In fact, whereas the work of the 
CEC and others subsequent to the entry into force of the NAAEC has shown 
relatively few competitiveness effects, it has shown scale effects, such as large 
increases in pollution from agricultural operations or increased use of forestry 
resources, from trade agreements.16 In addition, the NAAEC’s inherent 
structural flaws have limited its effectiveness in implementing both its 
cooperative and enforcement mandates. For example, the citizen submission 
process has become extremely adversarial, with governments whittling away at 
the Secretariat’s discretion to make decisions concerning the scope and 
eligibility of submissions.17 These flaws have led one observer to see some 
aspects of the NAAEC as “a cautionary tale counseling against simplistic 
adoption of the NAFTA environmental side agreement and its submission 
process as an equivalent environmental counterpart” in future trade 
agreements.18 
Despite the lessons that could be learned from the NAAEC, the United 
States has negotiated subsequent free trade agreements (FTAs),19 such as the 
Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement 
(DR-CAFTA)20 and the free trade agreements with Colombia21 and Peru,22 
 
 15. For a more complete discussion of scale effects, see infra Section II(A)(2). 
 16. See infra Section III.A. 
 17. See Chris Wold et al., The Inadequacy of the Citizen Submission Process of Articles 14 
& 15 of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 26 LOY. L.A. INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 415 (2004).  See also Geoff Garver, Tooth Decay, 25 ENVTL F. 34 (2008). 
 18. Tseming Yang, The Effectiveness of the NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement’s Citizen 
Submission Process: A Case Study of Metales y Derivados, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 443, 445 (2005) 
(making his comment in the context of the Metales y Derivados citizen submission process.) I 
have liberally embraced his comment to refer to the NAAEC more broadly. 
 19. Since NAFTA, the United States has completed bilateral or regional FTAs with 
Australia, Bahrain, Chile, Jordan, Morocco, Singapore, and, taken together under DR-CAFTA, 
the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua.  Two 
other FTAs, with Peru and Oman, have been approved by Congress but require implementing 
legislation.  The United States previously negotiated an FTA with Israel.  In addition, the United 
States has completed negotiations with Colombia, Panama and Korea, but is waiting for 
congressional approval of those agreements.  The USTR is further negotiating FTAs with 
Malaysia, the Southern African Customs Union (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and 
Swaziland), Thailand and the United Arab Emirates.  See U.S. Trade Representative, Bilateral 
Trade Agreements, http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Section_Index.html (last 
visited Oct. 30, 2008). 
 20. Central America-Dominican Republic-United States Free Trade Agreement, Aug. 5, 
2004, available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Regional/CAFTA/Section_Index.html 
[hereinafter DR-CAFTA]. 
 21. U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Colom., Nov. 22, 2006 (not yet in 
force), available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Colombia_FTA/Section_ 
Index.html [hereinafter U.S.-Colombia FTA]. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
206 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVIII:201 
without having evaluated the strengths and weaknesses of the NAAEC or the 
valuable contributions of the CEC to understanding competitiveness effects.23  
In fact, these subsequent FTAs adopt the NAAEC’s least relevant aspect—its 
enforcement focus—rather than embracing the more relevant focus on 
preventing scale effects. At the same time, subsequent FTAs eliminate the 
most useful aspects of the NAAEC.  For example, instead of mending the 
inherent structural problems that allow the Parties to change the scope and 
nature of a citizen submission concerning its own enforcement failure, 
subsequent FTAs either eliminate the citizen submission process altogether or 
sharply curtail the independence of the Secretariat.  In addition, no subsequent 
FTA grants a Secretariat the independence given the NAAEC’s Secretariat to 
prepare reports without governmental approval. No subsequent FTA includes 
an advisory committee similar to the NAAEC’s Joint Public Advisory 
Committee to provide oversight and advice to the Parties. Overall, subsequent 
FTAs reflect the efforts of the United States to eliminate independent 
assessment of trade-environment issues and oversight of the Parties’ work 
program as is now possible through the CEC. 
To successfully integrate trade liberalization with environmental 
protection, future FTAs must diminish the focus on enforcement and 
reenvision the cooperative aspects of the NAAEC. Perhaps of most 
importance, FTAs must individualize the environmental needs of trading 
partners, particularly with respect to scale effects, before implementing an 
FTA. The consideration of environmental needs, including the need to 
strengthen relevant institutions, must precede implementation of the FTA 
because trade-based economic growth and its corresponding environmental 
harm generally outpace any efficiency gains24 or the development of 
appropriate and effective environmental regulations.25  One FTA, the U.S.-
 
 22. U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Peru, April 12, 2006, (not yet in force), 
available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Peru_TPA/Section_Index.html 
[hereinafter U.S.-Peru FTA]. 
 23. Accord Garver, supra note 17, at 39 (concluding that “[i]t is clear that environmental 
mechanisms in the NAFTA package have not met their promise or potential, and yet they are 
being duplicated with little analysis or meaningful modification”). 
 24. CEC Secretariat, Understanding and Anticipating Environmental Change in North 
America: Building Blocks for Better Public Policy 3 (2003) (“Strong evidence now exists of some 
decoupling between economic growth and environmental degradation.  However, the North 
American economy and trade flows between NAFTA partners have been growing so rapidly that 
the increases in scale have tended to overwhelm the efficiency gains resulting from decoupling 
factors.”). 
 25. Scott Vaughan, The Greenest Trade Agreement Ever?: Measuring the Environmental 
Impacts of Agricultural Liberalization, in CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, 
NAFTA’S PROMISE AND REALITY: LESSONS FROM MEXICO FOR THE HEMISPHERE 61, 67 (2004) 
[hereinafter NAFTA’s PROMISE AND REALITY].  Vaughan assessed the environmental impacts of 
NAFTA on a number of agricultural sectors in Mexico, including maize, wheat, and fruit and 
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Peru FTA, begins the process of reenvisioning the trade-and-environment 
relationship.  Because it is well known that Peru has extremely valuable timber 
resources and woefully inadequate management and enforcement capacity in 
the forestry sector, the FTA specifically requires Peru to, among other things, 
increase the number and effectiveness of personnel devoted to managing 
Peru’s forestry laws and enforcing Peru’s laws, regulations and other measures 
relating to the harvest of, and trade in, timber products.26  Not only do these 
provisions address scale effects specific to Peru, but they also attempt to 
address the institutional shortcomings affecting those scale effects.  Until 
governments begin to incorporate scale effects and to individualize the 
environmental provisions in an FTA to the specific needs of the trading 
partners, FTAs will provide empty promises that trade liberalization can be 
successfully integrated with environmental protection. 
This article assesses the failure to incorporate the lessons learned from the 
NAAEC in subsequent U.S. FTAs and reenvisions the trade-environment 
relationship. Section II explores how concerns about specific trade-
environment effects led to the adoption of the NAAEC’s focus on 
enforcement.  Section III analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of the 
NAAEC.  Section IV summarizes the environmental provisions of FTAs 
negotiated since the NAAEC and describes why these provisions will not 
provide significant environmental benefits or further our understanding of 
trade-environment effects.  Section V provides recommendations for shifting 
the focus from competitiveness effects to scale effects in future FTAs, 
reviewing in particular the unique provisions of the U.S.-Peru FTA.  It also 
includes proposals for more positive engagement of civil society through a 
citizen submission process designed to deflect government hostility toward 
more collaborative and positive environmental outcomes.  Section VI 
concludes that the environmental benefits of trade agreements will continue to 
 
vegetables, and found environmental laws and institutions inadequate to address the 
environmental impacts associated with increased economic growth. Moreover, studies have 
shown that NAFTA has increased income disparities within Mexico, particularly in rural 
communities, and has led to sharp reductions in employment, particularly in the agricultural 
sector. As a consequence, economists and others have called for policies that anticipate the 
adverse effects of market liberalization.  Sandra Polaski, Jobs, Wages, and Household Income, in 
NAFTA’S PROMISE AND REALITY, supra, at 11, 12 (concluding that employment in the Mexican 
agriculture has “declined sharply” due to NAFTA and the “rural poor have borne the brunt of 
adjustment to NAFTA and have been forced to adapt without adequate government support”).  
See also J. EDWARD TAYLOR, TRADE INTEGRATION AND RURAL ECONOMIES IN LESS 
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES: LESSONS FROM MICRO ECONOMY-WIDE MODELS WITH PARTICULAR 
ATTENTION TO MEXICO AND CENTRAL AMERICA 1 (2002) (concluding that “high transaction 
costs and lack of access to capital and new product markets exclude poor rural households from 
many benefits of trade liberalization and may exacerbate poverty in the wake of trade reforms”). 
 26. U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 22, Annex 18.3.4, ¶¶ 3(a), (g). For more on the 
environmental provisions of U.S.-Peru FTA, see infra Section V.B. 
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be small if the United States continues to use the NAAEC as a model. 
Nonetheless, a focus on scale effects could be fashioned from existing efforts 
implemented under the environmental cooperative work programs, with the 
important caveat that much of these efforts must occur prior to implementation 
of the FTA, not after it. 
II.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF ENVIRONMENT PROVISIONS IN THE NAAEC 
Not only did the Tuna/Dolphin dispute awaken environmentalists to the 
potential environmental effects of trade liberalization, but it also spawned a 
critical analysis of trade-environment linkages.  These linkages became central 
to the debate over how to integrate environmental protection into NAFTA and 
helped to shape the institutions incorporated into the NAAEC.  Section A 
describes the different environmental effects of trade—regulatory, 
competitiveness and scale effects. Section B briefly summarizes the NAFTA 
negotiations before Section C describes how NAFTA’s anticipated effects 
shaped the provisions and institutions of the NAAEC. 
A. The Environmental Effects of Trade Liberalization 
Regulatory effects “concern the way international trade law restrains 
government policy choices and substantially impairs the regulatory authority of 
governments to protect national health and the environment and to secure 
effective protection of the global environment.”27 In the absence of 
environmental provisions in an FTA, international trade rules may, in fact, 
limit national, or even international, regulatory options for protection of the 
national environment.28 The Tuna/Dolphin dispute, in which a GATT panel 
ruled that U.S. efforts to limit its market to tuna caught using specific 
“dolphin-friendly” techniques violated GATT rules, is an example of 
regulatory effects. According to environmentalists, such regulatory effects 
undermine environmental protection because trade restrictions should be 
available as a regulatory policy tool “as leverage to promote worldwide 
environmental protection, particularly to address global or transboundary 
environmental problems and to reinforce environmental agreements.”29  
Environmentalists have been able to use the Tuna/Dolphin dispute and a small 
number of other high profile international trade challenges to environmental 
 
 27. CHRIS WOLD, SANFORD GAINES & GREG BLOCK, TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: LAW 
AND POLICY 7 (2005). 
 28. Id.  See also, DANIEL C. ESTY, GREENING THE GATT: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE 
FUTURE 42 (1992) (stating that trade agreements “can be used to override environmental 
regulations unless appropriate environmental provisions are built into the structure of the trade 
system”). 
 29. ESTY, supra note 28, at 42. 
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laws to press for provisions in FTAs to reduce regulatory effects.30 On the 
other hand, free trade proponents argue that trade agreements have a positive 
regulatory effect “by helping eliminate environmentally harmful subsidies and 
by facilitating transfer of pollution control technology.”31 Moreover, trade 
restrictions, especially unilateral ones, “often impose unfair economic burdens 
for environmental protection on developing countries.”32 
While regulatory effects played an important role in triggering the NAAEC 
negotiations, the NAAEC is actually silent on the issue.  In contrast, 
competitiveness effects have a much more prominent role in the NAAEC. 
Competitiveness effects “concern differences across countries in their national 
environmental standards and whether those differences impair the ability of 
firms in high-standards countries to compete with firms in low-standard 
countries.”33  According to some environmentalists, “[e]ven if the pollution 
they cause does not spill over onto other nations, countries with lax 
environmental standards may have a competitive advantage in the global 
marketplace and put pressure on countries with high environmental standards 
to reduce the rigor of their environmental requirements.”34  This is known as 
the “race to the bottom.”  In addition, environmentalists worry that investment 
will flow to areas with low environmental standards or weak enforcement of 
environmental standards, creating “pollution havens.” For trade proponents, 
however, competitiveness effects are not a legitimate argument against 
liberalized trade because differences in national environmental standards are 
 
 30. A review of these cases yields decidedly mixed results as to whether trade law prevented 
the accomplishment of the environmental objective.  In Tuna/Dolphin, for example, the United 
States did in fact impose discriminatory measures on Mexican fishermen that were unnecessary 
from an environmental perspective.  Although Mexican fishermen could kill 25% more dolphins 
than U.S. fishermen in the Eastern Tropical Pacific yellowfin tuna fishery, they could kill only 
25% more than the number of dolphins actually killed by U.S. fishermen.  Thus, the fishermen 
cannot know until the end of the season whether their dolphin mortality was consistent with U.S. 
restrictions.  Imposing a quota would have been a much more sensible approach from a trade 
perspective and an environmental perspective, provided that the quota bore some relationship to 
dolphin needs.  In United States—Reformulated Gasoline, the U.S. Congress prevented the EPA 
from implementing nondiscriminatory rules for ascertaining pollutant levels in domestic and 
foreign gasoline.  Congress directed the EPA to impose stricter requirements on foreign 
producers.  Naturally, a WTO panel found these discriminatory requirements inconsistent with 
Article III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which requires WTO members to treat 
imported products “no less favorably” than domestic products.  Panel Report, United States—
Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline Report of the Panel, WT/DS2/R (Jan. 29, 
1996), (adopted May 20, 1996), reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 276 (1996). 
 31. See Jagdish Bhagwati, Trade and Environment: The False Conflict?, in TRADE AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLICY 159, 162–163 (Durwood Zaelke et al., eds., 
1993). 
 32. Id. 
 33. WOLD, GAINES & BLOCK, supra note 27, at 7. 
 34. Id. 
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justified as an expression of a country’s environmental conditions and its 
priorities and preferences.35  For example, while Americans may prefer 
conservation of dolphins and other marine mammals, regardless of their 
conservation status, others may view them as a culturally important food 
source. 
Despite the arguments of free trade proponents, competitiveness and 
enforcement concerns played a central role in framing the NAFTA and 
NAAEC negotiations because of the presence of maquiladoras along the U.S-
Mexico border.  At the time of these negotiations, it was widely acknowledged 
that maquiladoras36 on the Mexican side of the U.S.-Mexico border had caused 
extraordinary pollution.  While it cannot be said that maquiladoras polluted the 
entire border region,37 they had turned some areas into “a virtual cesspool and 
breeding ground for infectious diseases.”38 Because the maquiladoras operated 
consistently with free trade principles—they are allowed to import tariff-free 
raw materials and export finished products without paying export tariffs39—
 
 35. Bhagwati, supra note 31, at 166–67. 
 36. “Maquiladoras” are a creation of Mexican law.  They may be jointly owned by foreign 
and Mexican corporations, wholly-owned Mexican firms, or wholly-owned subsidiaries of 
foreign firms—Japanese, Korean, Dutch, etc., as well as U.S. or Canadian companies.  Originally, 
maquiladoras needed to be located along the 2,000-mile United States-Mexico border, but that 
requirement was eliminated many years ago.  Maquiladoras can now be found in many interior 
locations in Mexico. Under Mexican law, these factories may import raw materials or 
components tariff-free from U.S. and other suppliers. In many cases, these semi-finished products 
may be shipped back to other countries, such as the United States, for sale, again tariff-free.  One 
Mexican business website describes a maquiladora as follows: 
A maquila program entitles the company, first, to foreign investment participation in the 
capital—and in management—of up to 100% without need of any special authorization; 
second, it entitles the company to special customs treatment, allowing duty free temporary 
import of machinery, equipment, parts and materials, and administrative equipment such 
as computers, and communications devices, subject only to posting a bond guaranteeing 
that such goods will not remain in Mexico permanently. 
Mexico Data On-Line, What is a Maquiladora? Manufacturing In Mexico: The Mexican In-Bond 
(Maquila) Program, Feb. 16, 2007, http://www.mexconnect.com/business/mex2000maquiladora 
2.html. 
 37. That maquiladoras have created substantial local air and water pollution and 
contamination of soil with hazardous wastes is undisputed, but this pollution has occurred largely 
in urban areas.  It is inaccurate to say, as some have, that the maquiladoras have contaminated the 
entire border region.  After all, the border region includes Big Bend National Park (in Texas) in 
addition to many state parks and vast, unpopulated areas of desert and mountains. 
 38. Michael Satchell, Poisoning the Border, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, May 6, 1991, at 
32, 34 (quoting American Medical Association report).  See also Knox & Markell, supra note 13, 
at 3 (noting that “the maquiladoras had overwhelmed local facilities for providing clean water 
and treating waste”). 
 39. For example, wastes generated by maquiladora facilities from raw materials imported 
in-bond from the United States are considered to be U.S.-generated and must be “exported” back 
to the United States for disposal.  Agreement Between the United States of America and the 
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these serious environmental impacts became a central NAFTA negotiation 
issue.  Indeed, environmentalists capitalized on this point to argue that NAFTA 
would lead to additional pollution havens in Mexico, that Mexico already had 
weak environmental laws and would use those laws to attract businesses from 
Canada and the United States, and, more generally, that NAFTA’s trade 
liberalizing effects would increase the depletion of natural resources in North 
America by reducing costs of production.40 
Due to this criticism, the United States undertook an analysis of Mexico’s 
environmental laws. On closer inspection, Mexico, it was learned, had 
environmental standards equivalent to, and in some circumstances stricter than, 
U.S. standards.41  What accounted then for the deplorable conditions near 
many maquiladoras?  According to another analysis, Mexico’s enforcement of 
environmental laws was weak and crippled by inadequate allocation of 
resources.42  As a consequence, environmental enforcement became a major 
focus of the NAAEC. 
The allure of the high-profile Tuna/Dolphin and maquiladora issues 
caused scale and composition effects to receive much less attention in the 
NAFTA/NAAEC negotiations.43  Scale and composition effects “concern the 
growing scale of international trade and the composition of that trade, that is, 
 
United Mexican States on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment in 
the Border Area, U.S.-Mex., Annex III, Aug. 14, 1983 [hereinafter La Paz Agreement], available 
at http://www.epa.gov/Border2012/docs/LaPazAgreement.pdf.  See also Sanford Gaines, Bridges 
to a Better Environment: Building Cross-Border Institutions for Environmental Improvement in 
the U.S.-Mexico Border Area, 12 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 429, 443 n.55 (1995). 
 40. For a history of the involvement of nongovernmental organizations in the negotiation of 
NAFTA and the NAAEC, including criticisms of trade liberalization, see PIERRE MARC JOHNSON 
& ANDRÉ BEAULIEU, THE ENVIRONMENT AND NAFTA: UNDERSTANDING AND IMPLEMENTING 
THE NEW CONTINENTAL LAW 24–34 (1996).  See also Kal Raustiala, The Political Implications 
of the Enforcement Provisions of the NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement: The CEC as a 
Model for Future Accords, 25 ENVTL. L. 31 (1995). 
 41. The U.S. Government Accounting Office concluded that “Mexico’s laws and regulations 
are in many respects comparable to U.S. laws and regulations and in some cases are even 
stricter.” U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-93-137, NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE 
AGREEMENT: ASSESSMENT OF MAJOR ISSUES, 115 (1993).  See also U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTING 
OFFICE, GAO/NSIAD-91-227, U.S.-MEXICO TRADE: INFORMATION ON ENVIRONMENTAL 
REGULATIONS AND ENFORCEMENT (1991) (finding enforcement of Mexican environmental laws 
to be weak). 
 42. U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-92-113, U.S.-MEXICO TRADE: 
ASSESSMENT OF MEXICO’S ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROLS FOR NEW COMPANIES (1992). 
 43. Scale and compositional effects were by no means ignored.  The environmental review 
of NAFTA, for example, identified species loss and other possible effects of NAFTA.  
INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE COORDINATED BY THE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE, REVIEW OF U.S.-MEXICO ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES (1992) (analyzing the 
effects of the potential NAFTA on the environment in both Mexico and the United States). 
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the particular mix of goods being traded.”44 Although economists often 
consider scale and composition as two separate factors, each raises the 
question of sustainability and the size of the economy or specific economic 
sectors: 
The overall scale of world economic activity raises significant challenges for 
all elements of environmental protection, from resource conservation to 
pollution control, and a substantial and growing fraction of that activity 
involves international trade.  By the same token, the composition of trade 
significantly determines its environmental consequences.  For example, trade 
in fish and in agricultural products has a bearing on fishing effort and land-use 
practices around the world.  Trade in lumber and pulp and paper affects forest 
conservation and forest management in many countries.  As two prominent 
economists once remarked, “While many nice things can be said about 
liberalizing and thus increasing trade, the structure of trade, as we know it at 
present, is a curse from the perspective of sustainable development.”45 
For environmentalists, “[w]ithout environmental safeguards, trade may 
cause environmental harm by promoting economic growth that results in the 
unsustainable consumption of natural resources and waste production.”46  
While this criticism could apply to any kind of growth, not just trade-related 
growth, trade-based economic growth poses unique problems.  As described 
more fully in Section IV.A.2, lowering trade barriers allows a rush of 
economic activity and quick exploitation of natural resources before ill-
equipped regulatory bodies can adapt regulations and other infrastructure to the 
new circumstances. In such circumstances, any benefits from trade-led 
economic growth are outweighed by environmental harm.47  For free trade 
proponents, such as Jagdish Bhagwati,48 even though freer trade may lead to 
economic growth, growth can improve environmental conditions by altering 
social preferences for environmental protection and increasing economic 
resources available to spend on environmental enhancement measures. 
 
 44. WOLD, GAINES & BLOCK, supra note 27, at 6. 
 45. Id. at 6–7. (citing T. Haavelmo & S. Hansen, On the Strategy of Trying to Reduce 
Economic Inequality by Expanding the Scale of Human Activity, in ENVIRONMENTALLY 
SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: BUILDING ON BRUNDTLAND at 27, 34. (R. Goodland 
et al., eds., World Bank, 1991). 
 46. ESTY, supra note 28, at 42.  Professor Esty did not necessarily advocate this point of 
view, but he was perhaps the first to analyze trade-environment linkages in a sophisticated way.  
As part of that analysis, he succinctly summarized the main arguments of environmentalists and 
free trade proponents.  See also WOLD, GAINES & BLOCK, supra note 27, at 5–8; Greg Block, 
Trade and Environment in the Western Hemisphere: Expanding the North American Agreement 
on Environmental Cooperation into the Americas, 33 ENVTL. L. 501, 511–12 (2003). 
 47. See infra notes 114–123 and accompanying text.. 
 48. Bhagwati, supra note 31, at 159. 
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B. The NAFTA/NAAEC Negotiations 
The negotiations to incorporate environmental provisions in NAFTA 
began with President George H. W. Bush.  After reports concluded that 
Mexico allocated inadequate funds toward enforcement of its environmental 
standards, environmentalists and the U.S. government made a number of 
proposals to address enforcement concerns. Consistent with the standard 
remedy in trade disputes, most of these proposals included some form of trade 
sanctions for failures to enforce environmental law.49  Many environmentalists 
also advocated for a powerful commission that could monitor and enforce 
environmental regulations of all three Parties and investigate allegations of 
noncompliance with environmental law brought to the commission’s attention 
by governments or citizens.50  Others sought a less robust commission that 
would instead provide a neutral forum for cooperation and coordination of 
environmental issues by the three Parties, facilitating implementation of 
NAFTA’s environmental provisions and ensuring public participation.51  These 
differences of opinion deeply split the environmental community, with a 
coalition of twenty-three environmental groups ultimately criticizing the 
approach of President Bush.52  When Bill Clinton became president, the 
NAFTA negotiations had already been completed, but Congress had not yet 
adopted it.  To win the support of environmentalists, he embarked on a more 
aggressive approach than the Bush administration. 
Nevertheless, Mexico and Canada were not willing partners in these 
negotiations, and they certainly did not embrace reopening NAFTA itself or 
any of the options that included trade restrictions.53 That left the U.S. 
 
 49. For a thorough history of the NAFTA and NAAEC negotiations, see Robert F. Housman 
& Paul M. Orbuch, Integrating Labor and Environmental Concerns into the North American 
Free Trade Agreement: A Look Back and a Look Ahead, 8 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 719 
(1993).  See also Steve Charnovitz, The NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement: Implications for 
Environmental Cooperation, Trade Policy, and American Treatymaking, 8 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. 
L.J. 257, 257–259 (1994); Knox & Markell, supra note 13, at 3–9. 
 50. Letter from CIEL to Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans, International Environment 
& Scientific Affairs, Curtis Bohlen, (Nov. 18, 1992); Housman & Orbuch, supra note 49, at 791 
(citing Letter from John Audley, Sierra Club, to Sanford Gaines, the Assistant U.S. Trade 
Representative (Oct. 16, 1992)).  The Housman and Orbuch article provides an excellent history 
of the environmental negotiations. 
 51. Housman & Orbuch, supra note 49, 791–92 (citing Letter from USTR Carla Hills to Jay 
Hair, President, National Wildlife Federation (Sept. 29, 1992)). 
 52. Id. at 792 (noting that the organizations complained that the Administration’s proposed 
Commission, as summarized by Housman and Orbuch, “would have too limited a scope, no 
enforcement powers, inadequate funding, and few, if any avenues for public participation either 
in the negotiations or in the procedures of the [commission] itself”). 
 53. See, e.g., Robert Housman, Paul Orbuch, & William Snape, Enforcement of 
Environmental Laws Under a Supplemental Agreement to the North American Free Trade 
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administration in the middle, trying to appease U.S. environmental 
organizations while also trying to reach agreement with its NAFTA partners.  
In the end, Mexico and Canada conceded that some agreement relating to the 
environment was necessary to bring NAFTA’s trade-liberalizing provisions 
into force.  Similarly, the United States realized that it could not push Mexico 
and Canada too far and that some middle ground was necessary.  These 
tensions gave rise to the NAAEC, a freestanding agreement separate from 
NAFTA. 
C. The NAAEC’s Environmental Provisions 
Despite the compromises needed to resolve tensions between the 
negotiating Parties, the NAAEC had the potential to transform the way we 
think about trade-environment issues. Its provisions and institutions were 
deemed “innovative”54 and even “revolutionary.”55  Rather than focus solely 
on the effects of trade liberalization on the environment, the NAAEC includes 
a broader environmental mandate within the context of trade negotiations.56  It 
pairs U.S. concerns about economic competitiveness with the broader goal of 
fostering the improvement of the North American environment.57  It twines 
these two goals by seeking to protect and enhance the North American 
environment, including in the context of trade,58 through cooperation and 
 
Agreement, 5 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 593, 613–619 (1993) (proposing a sanctions-based 
model proposed by the Center for International Environmental Law and Defenders of Wildlife). 
 54. Chris Wold et al., supra note 17, at 416.  See Knox & Markell, supra note 13, at 2. 
 55. John J. Kirton, Winning Together: The NAFTA Trade-Environment Record, in LINKING 
TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND SOCIAL COHESION: NAFTA EXPERIENCES, GLOBAL CHALLENGES 
73, 74 (John J. Kirton & Virginia W. MacLaren eds., 2002). 
 56. The NAAEC is almost entirely divorced from trade-related aspects of environmentalism.  
Article 10(6) requires the Council to “contribut[e] to the prevention or resolution of environment-
related trade disputes” and “consider[] on an ongoing basis the environmental effects of the 
NAFTA.”  NAAEC, supra note 5, art. 10(6). 
 57. One assessment of the NAAEC, known as the Independent Review Committee (IRC), 
described the NAAEC as follows: 
The IRC believes it is important to see the NAAEC as a complete agreement in its own 
right, and not just as a “side agreement” to a trade deal. In the Committee’s view, the 
NAAEC is a critically important element to achieve the goal of sustainable development 
in North America. Moreover, the NAAEC is not just a trade and environment agreement 
in the technical or legal sense. Rather, the mandate of the CEC, as the Committee 
understands it, is more broadly defined as the protection and enhancement of the 
environment in North America in the context of changing economic patterns, including 
the relevant trade and environment issues. The long term value of the CEC will be 
measured by its fulfilment of this mandate. 
Independent Review Committee, Four-Year Review of the North American Agreement on 
Environmental Cooperation, vii (1998), available at http://www.cec.org. 
 58. An early review of the NAAEC and the Commission for Environmental Cooperation 
specifically called on the CEC to make “trade and environment linkages part of the ‘living 
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cooperative environmental programs.  The NAAEC identifies a diverse array 
of potential cooperation,59 “bound loosely by a broad conception of 
environment and, more practically, by the ability of the three countries to reach 
consensus on priorities and lines of action in its annual program of work.”60 
The NAAEC’s origins in competitiveness concerns arising from weak 
enforcement are readily apparent, with each Party committing to ensure that its 
laws and regulations provide for “high levels” of environmental protection61 
and to “effectively enforce” its environmental laws through appropriate 
government action.62  The NAAEC also requires Parties to ensure that 
administrative and judicial proceedings are transparent and available63 and that 
appropriate sanctions and remedies are provided to compel enforcement with 
environmental law.64  It further commits the Parties to ensure that its citizens 
have private access to remedies for violations of its environmental laws and 
regulations, and that persons with a “legally recognized interest” have access 
to courts and administrative bodies for the enforcement of a Party’s 
 
program’ of the CEC” by defining its trade-environment mandate to include “exploiting trade 
opportunities for environmental improvement and to ensuring that trade-related growth, 
particularly growth in production, does not impair the environment of any country.”  Id. at xi, 6. 
 59. Article 10(2), for example, sets forth a nonexhaustive list of nineteen possible areas for 
the Parties to consider and develop recommendations, including: comparability of techniques and 
methodologies for data gathering and analysis; pollution prevention techniques and strategies; 
approaches and common indicators for reporting on the state of the environment; transboundary 
and border environmental issues; exotic species that may be harmful; the protection of threatened 
and endangered species; environmental matters as they relate to economic development; 
ecologically sensitive national accounts; ecolabeling; and “other matters as it may decide.”  
NAAEC, supra note 5, art. 10(2). 
 60. WOLD, GAINES & BLOCK, supra note 27, at 793.  The overall tone of the NAAEC has 
been described as follows: 
The NAAEC includes an odd mix of mandatory language (“shalls”) followed by words 
that often negate or weaken the obligation.  For example, Article 3 requires that each 
Party “shall ensure that its laws and regulations provide for high levels of environmental 
protection and shall strive to continue to improve those laws and regulations.”  Yet, 
Article 3 also grants each Party the right to establish its own levels of domestic 
environmental protection, and nowhere do the Parties define or establish threshold limits 
for “high levels.”  Similarly, commitments are often qualified by “appropriate” or are 
framed in aspirational language such as “strive for,” “promote,” or “seek to.” 
Id. 
 61. NAAEC, supra note 5, art. 3. 
 62. Id. art. 5 (noting that “appropriate governmental action” includes, among other things, 
appointing and training inspectors, publicly disclosing non-compliance information, promoting 
environmental audits, and initiating enforcement proceedings for violations of environmental 
law). 
 63. Id. art. 5(2). 
 64. Id. art. 5(3). 
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environmental laws and regulations.65  Parties must also ensure that such 
proceedings are “fair, open, and equitable.”66 
1. The NAAEC’s Institutions 
To achieve its objectives and help the Parties implement its provisions, the 
NAAEC creates the CEC, a trilateral international institution, comprising a 
Council, Secretariat and Joint Public Advisory Committee (JPAC).  The 
Council is the governing body of the CEC, headed by the cabinet-level 
environmental official of each country.  As part of its duty to serve as a forum 
for promoting and facilitating cooperation between the Parties on 
environmental matters, the Council adopts a cooperative work program on a 
range of issues concerning the North American environment.  Except for a few 
important exceptions, Council decisions are taken by consensus.67  With an 
equal voice in governing its affairs, each NAFTA Party contributes an equal 
share to the CEC budget.68 
The CEC Secretariat provides technical, administrative and operational 
support to the Council.  It also possesses some autonomous investigatory and 
reporting authority, including the authority to prepare reports on matters within 
the scope of the work program.69  The Secretariat’s unit on Submissions on 
Enforcement Matters processes citizen submissions on failures to effectively 
enforce environmental law and develop “factual records,” when approved by 
the Parties.70 
The JPAC consists of fifteen individuals—five members from each 
country—appointed by the head of state in each country to advise the Parties 
on any matter within the scope of the NAAEC, to comment on the Secretariat’s 
work plan and to consult with the public in open meetings on aspects of the 
 
 65. Id. art. 6. 
 66. NAAEC, supra note 5, art. 7. 
 67. The Council meets at least once a year in regular sessions which must include a public 
meeting.  Id. art. 9(3). 
In practice, these meetings routinely draw hundreds of stakeholders from the region and 
provide, among other things, an important opportunity for NGOs to establish and fortify 
regional networks on issues of regional concern. Council-appointed “alternative 
representatives,” government working groups, and several committees meet much more 
frequently throughout the year to address a wide array of issues ranging from 
implementation plans to voting on factual records. 
WOLD, GAINES & BLOCK, supra note 27, at 794. 
 68. NAAEC, supra note 5, art. 43. 
 69. Id. art. 13(1).  The Secretariat may also prepare reports on other matters, but it must 
notify the Council, which must approve the request by a two-thirds vote.  Id. 
 70. Id. arts. 14–15.  The Council must approve the preparation of a factual record by a two-
thirds vote.  Id. art. 15(2). 
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CEC=s program.71  As noted by Professor John Wirth, a former JPAC 
member: 
Not surprisingly, there has been friction at times between nongovernmental 
JPAC members and the deputy ministers and other federal officials who staff 
the Council, particularly over the rules and procedures for addressing citizen 
complaints over nonenforcement of environmental laws.  In fact, a certain 
creative tension is built right into the JPAC’s role. In the nearly eight years 
since it was constituted in 1994, JPAC has become an effective, visible and 
respected branch of the CEC.  It continues to evolve as the CEC itself evolves 
as an institution.72 
According to Professor Wirth, the JPAC has been successful, in part, due to its 
early decision to eschew national identities, instead choosing “to interact as 
North Americans rather than . . . as advocates or defenders of national 
positions or as representatives of any particular private voluntary organization 
or interest group.”73  This comment has particular resonance given the trend in 
subsequent FTAs to consolidate decisionmaking within governments. 
2. The NAAEC’s Enforcement Provisions 
Two mechanisms underscore the NAAEC’s emphasis on enforcement and 
competitiveness concerns. The NAAEC creates a procedure that allows a 
complaining Party to seek the imposition of a monetary assessment if a Party is 
found by a tribunal to have engaged in a “persistent pattern” of failure to 
enforce environmental law with potential competitiveness effects in the 
NAFTA region.74  In addition, it establishes a citizen submission process that 
provides an avenue for groups or individuals to allege that a Party is failing to 
effectively enforce its environmental laws.75  These mechanisms constitute the 
NAAEC’s “teeth” in what otherwise would be solely a forum for regional 
environmental cooperation. 
a. The Government Sanctions Process 
A Party initiates the “sanctions” process by requesting consultation to 
determine whether another Party is engaging in a “persistent pattern of failure 
to effectively enforce its environmental law,”76 defined as “a sustained or 
recurring course of action or inaction beginning after the date of entry into 
 
 71. Id. art. 16. 
 72. John D. Wirth, Perspectives on the Joint Public Advisory Committee, in GREENING 
NAFTA, supra note 13, at 199. 
 73. Id. at 201. 
 74. NAAEC, supra note 5, arts. 22–36. 
 75. Id. arts. 14–15. 
 76. Id. art. 22. 
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force of this agreement.”77  When these consultations fail to resolve the matter 
and the dispute concerns trade between the Parties, the Council may upon a 
two-thirds vote convene an arbitral panel to prepare a report with 
recommendations for better enforcement.78  If the panel finds a persistent 
failure to enforce environmental law by a Party, the disputing Parties “may” 
agree on a “mutually satisfactory action plan, which normally shall conform to 
the determinations and recommendations of the panel.”79  If the Parties cannot 
agree on a plan or there is disagreement over implementation of a plan, any 
disputing Party may petition to reconvene the panel, which may impose a plan 
on the Parties.80  If the panel concludes that a Party is not fully implementing 
the plan, it may impose a monetary penalty not to exceed .007% of total trade 
between the Parties.81  If a Party fails to pay, the other Party in the dispute may 
suspend NAFTA benefits in an amount not to exceed the monetary 
assessment.82 
The process includes an odd twist: instead of paying damages to the Party 
harmed by the failure to enforce, the Party failing to enforce its environmental 
law ultimately receives the penalty money.  After the Party pays the penalty to 
CEC,83 the Council expends the money “to improve or enhance the 
environment or environmental law enforcement in the Party complained 
against.”84 
To date, no Party has initiated consultations or even threatened to do so.  
Nonetheless: 
[T]he sanctions provisions cast a long shadow over the cooperative nature of 
the NAAEC and arguably have made the Parties hypersensitive to the citizen 
submission procedure for fear that an issue raised by a citizen could later 
become the subject of the more consequential governmental sanctions process.  
Ironically, this has become the most visible provision in the U.S. government’s 
FTAA negotiations, even as many of the NGOs who supported the idea have 
quietly distanced themselves from sanctions, instead calling for greater 
incentive-based mechanisms to improve environmental protection and 
enforcement in developing countries.85 
 
 77. Id. art. 45. 
 78. Id. art. 24. 
 79. NAAEC, supra note 5, art. 33. 
 80. Id. art. 34. 
 81. Id. art. 34(5), Annex 34. 
 82. Id. art. 36. 
 83. Id. Annex 34.3. 
 84. NAAEC, supra note 5, Annex 34.3. 
 85. WOLD, GAINES & BLOCK, supra note 27, at 796. 
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b. The Citizen Submission Process 
The NAAEC allows nongovernmental organizations or individuals to file 
submissions with the Secretariat alleging that Canada, Mexico or the United 
States “is failing to effectively enforce its environmental law.”86  Assuming 
that the submitter meets some basic eligibility requirements,87 the Secretariat 
has discretion to request a response to the submission from the Party “against” 
whom the submission is directed.  If the Secretariat believes that a response is 
unnecessary, the matter is closed; the submitter cannot appeal this decision.  In 
deciding whether a Party should prepare a response, the Secretariat considers 
whether the submission alleges harm to the person or organization making the 
submission; whether the submission, alone or in combination with other 
submissions, raises matters whose further study in this process would advance 
the goals of the NAAEC; whether private remedies available under the Party’s 
law have been pursued;88 and whether the submission is drawn exclusively 
from mass media reports.89 
 
 86. NAAEC, supra note 5, art. 14(1). 
 87. The submitter, who must be a person or organization from one of the three NAAEC 
Parties, must provide sufficient information to allow the Secretariat to review the submission, 
demonstrate that it has communicated in writing with the relevant authorities concerning the 
matter of the petition, indicate the Party’s response, if any, write the submission in the language 
specified by that Party, clearly identify the organization or person submitting the petition, and aim 
the submission at enforcement—not at harassment—of industry.  The Secretariat has discretion to 
reject the submission for failing to meet any of these requirements.  The submitter has no 
mechanism to appeal the decision of the Secretariat.  Id. 
 88. The NAAEC does not explicitly require a submitter to first pursue private remedies 
before a petition might be accepted for purposes of Article 14; it is merely something about which 
the defending Party may advise the Secretariat.  The Secretariat, however, has refused to consider 
a submission because the submitters had not “diligently pursu[ed] local remedies between the 
time of the government’s adoption and implementation of [the law] and the date the submission 
was filed.”  Commission for Environmental Cooperation, Determination pursuant to Articles 14 
& 15 of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, at 3, A14/SEM/97-
004/03/14(1) (May 26, 1997), available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/97-4-DET-E.pdf. 
 89. NAAEC, supra note 5, art. 14(2), at 1488.  In one of the first Article 14 petitions, the 
Secretariat concluded that the burden to show harm is substantially less for Article 14 petitions 
than for civil actions in many countries.  Mexico, the responding Party, argued that submitters did 
not adequately allege harm to the members of their organizations.  Nonetheless, the Secretariat 
ruled that the submitters met their burden: 
In considering harm, the Secretariat notes the importance and character of the resource in 
question—a portion of the magnificent Paradise corral reef located in the Caribbean 
waters of Quintana Roo.  While the Secretariat recognizes that the submitters may not 
have alleged the particularized, individual harm required to acquire legal standing to bring 
suit in some civil proceedings in North America, the especially public nature of marine 
resources bring the submitters within the spirit and intent of Article 14 of the NAAEC. 
Commission for Environmental Cooperation, Recommendation of the Secretariat to Council for 
the Development of a Factual Record in accordance with Articles 14 and 15 of the North 
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If the Secretariat determines that a response from the “defendant” Party is 
necessary, the Party has thirty days to respond.90  If the Party chooses to 
respond, it should state whether the matter is or was the subject of pending 
judicial or administrative proceedings, and whether private remedies are 
available.91  Although the NAAEC only requires termination of a submission 
when a pending judicial or administrative proceeding has been initiated by the 
government, the Secretariat has refused to request permission from the Council 
to develop a factual record even when nongovernmental organizations have 
initiated proceedings concerning the same subject matter as the submission.92 
The Secretariat has discretion to request authorization from the Council to 
prepare a factual record upon receiving a response from the Party.93  Again, the 
Secretariat may determine that the response is sufficient and end the matter 
with no chance for the submitter to appeal.  Nonetheless, if the Secretariat 
recommends to the Council that a factual record is warranted, the Council must 
approve the Secretariat’s recommendation by a two-thirds vote.94 If the 
Council approves the recommendation to develop a factual record, the 
Secretariat may consider information that is publicly available or information 
submitted to it by interested persons, NGOs or the JPAC.95  The Secretariat 
does not have the authority, however, to subpoena documents.96 The factual 
 
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (Cozumel), at 5, A14/SEM/96-001/07/ADV 
(June 7, 1996), available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/96-1-ADV-E.pdf. 
 90. NAAEC, supra note 5, art. 14(3). 
 91. Id. The NAAEC defines “judicial or administrative proceeding” as “a domestic judicial, 
quasi-judicial or administrative action pursued by the Party.” Id. art. 45(3) (emphasis added). 
 92. See Commission for Environmental Cooperation, Determination pursuant to Articles 14 
& 15 of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (Oldman River I), 
A14/SEM/96-003/12/15(1) (Apr. 2, 1997), available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/96-3-
DET-OE3.pdf [hereinafter Oldman River I—Article 15(1) Determination].  Submitters in this 
case eventually abandoned the judicial proceedings and re-petitioned to the Secretariat a year 
later.  The Friends of the Oldman River, North American Agreement on Environmental 
Cooperation Article 14 Submission, A14/SEM-97-006/01/SUB (Oct. 4, 1997) available at 
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/97-6-SUB-E.pdf. After reviewing the new submission, this 
petition, the Secretariat determined that a response from the Party was warranted.  Commission 
for Environmental Cooperation, Article 15(1) Notification to Council that Development of a 
Factual Record is Warranted (Oldman River II), A14/SEM-97-006/15/ADV (July 19, 1999), 
available at http://www.cec.org/ files/pdf/sem/97-6-ADV-E.pdf. 
 93. NAAEC, supra note 5, art. 15(1). 
 94. Id. art. 15(2). 
 95. Id. art. 15(4). 
 96. The Secretariat must submit a draft factual record to the Council.  Any Party has forty-
five days to comment on the accuracy of the draft.  Neither the Council nor the Secretariat is 
under an obligation to make the draft public, and the NAAEC does not expressly grant interested 
persons or NGOs the right to comment on the draft.  The Secretariat must incorporate any 
comments of the Parties in the final factual record and submit it to the Council.  The Council, by 
a two-thirds vote, may make public the factual record.  Id. arts. 15(5) and (6). 
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record does not indicate whether there has been a failure to enforce 
environmental law or suggest ways that enforcement could be improved.  
Instead, by describing the facts of a submission and the government’s 
response, the factual record shines a light on government action, which readers 
are free to interpret. 
3. The Secretariat’s Independent Functions 
In addition to managing the citizen submission process, including the 
discretion to make various findings without Council oversight, the Secretariat 
also has independent authority to prepare reports—known as Article 13 
reports—on environmental matters unrelated to enforcement issues.97 If the 
report is included within the annual work program of the CEC, then the 
Secretariat does not need to seek Council approval before initiating its report.  
The Secretariat may also prepare reports “related to the cooperative functions” 
of the NAAEC unless the Council objects by a two-thirds vote.98  At the time 
of the NAAEC negotiations, the Parties understood Article 13 as granting the 
Secretariat authority “to exercise its own professional judgment independent of 
the Council and the Parties.”99 
III.  THE SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF THE NAAEC 
The CEC and its constituent bodies—the Council, JPAC and Secretariat—
present an interesting and unique model for international institutions in areas 
touching on governance, accountability and transparency. While a 
governmental decisionmaking body is the norm in international institutions, a 
secretariat with limited independent authority and a citizen advisory body is 
unusual—convention secretariats generally provide only administrative 
support to governments.  An international agreement with a citizen advisory 
 
 97. Id. art. 13. 
 98. NAAEC, supra note 5, art. 13(1). 
 99. David A. Wirth, The North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation’s 
Implementation of Article 13 of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation 
(2005) (report prepared for North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation). John 
Knox, who was involved in the negotiations as an official with the Department of State, has 
written that the NAAEC “requires the Secretariat” to implement Article 13 “with little Council 
oversight.” Knox & Markell, supra note 13, at 12. Another person involved in the negotiations 
with the Environmental Protection Agency, Dan Magraw, concurred, noting that the “secretariat 
will have strong elements of independence” and that Article 13 involves “reporting on different 
types of topics . . . by the independent secretariat.  Daniel Magraw, NAFTA’s Repercussions: Is 
Green Trade Possible?, 36 ENVIRONMENT 14, 20 (Mar. 1994). 
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body like the JPAC100 and a citizen submission process101 are clearly the 
exception, not the rule. 
Because of these innovations and its birth within the context of the 
NAFTA negotiations, the NAAEC has been subject to a number of reviews, 
including two contracted by the Parties themselves.102  There is little doubt that 
the CEC has helped create a North American environmental agenda. At the 
same time, it is clear that the structural flaws of the NAAEC have prevented it 
from achieving a number of its goals. As a consequence, the CEC has 
struggled to meet the expectations arising from its unique structure and high-
profile origins while also balancing its roles as regional facilitator, convener, 
statistician and watchdog.103 
A. The Environmental Effects of Trade 
The NAAEC has been particularly important for improving our 
understanding of the effects of trade on the environment.  Not only has the 
CEC developed models for assessing those effects,104 but it also has broadened 
our understanding of how to pursue trade-environment linkages.  Nonetheless, 
the full scope of effects could not be ascertained because, the CEC concluded, 
the “lack of high-quality environmental data hampers analysis of trade-
environment linkages.”105  Significantly, this data is needed prior to adoption 
of an FTA in order to accurately assess the impacts of trade on the 
environment. 
 
 100. While international environmental agreements usually allow citizens to attend meetings 
of the parties as “observers” and may make interventions during the course of the meeting, they 
do not have a formal advisory capacity as the JPAC does. 
 101. The World Bank and other multilateral development banks also have citizen submission 
processes. 
 102. The two reviews commissioned by the Parties are Ten-Year Review Committee, Ten 
Years of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (June 15, 2004) 
[hereinafter TRAC] and Independent Review Committee, supra note 57.  Among the other 
reviews, see Greg Block, supra note 46 and Mary E. Kelly & Cyrus Reed, The CEC’s Trade and 
Environment Program: Cutting-Edge Analysis but Untapped Potential, in GREENING NAFTA, 
supra note 13, at 101.  See generally GREENING NAFTA, supra note 13. 
 103. See WOLD, GAINES & BLOCK, supra note 27, at 795. 
 104. The CEC has concluded that “no single or ‘best’ assessment method exists, and that a 
range of different approaches, models, indicators and means of building meaningful correlations 
between free trade and environmental change ought to be pursued simultaneously. Work thus far 
shows a sufficient empirical basis to suggest causality between trade liberalization and trade 
expansion, and changes in both environmental quality, and environmental policies.”  Scott 
Vaughan & Greg Block, CEC Secretariat, Free Trade and the Environment: The Picture Becomes 
Clearer 31 (2002). 
 105. Id. at 26. 
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1. Competitiveness Effects 
Despite the widespread belief that environmental conditions would worsen 
in Mexico as a result of NAFTA, the work of the CEC and others has shown 
that trade liberalization does not generally result in competitiveness effects; 
that is, liberalized trade does not lead to lax environmental standards, a race to 
the bottom, pollution havens or the migration of businesses to countries with 
lax environmental standards. In one study of competitiveness effects in the 
NAFTA region, researchers used three measures of environmental quality (per 
capita sulfur dioxide emissions, per capita toxic chemical releases and state 
compliance costs) and found “no evidence that border states altered the manner 
in which they determined their levels of environmental protection during the 
1990s.”106  In fact, they concluded that environmental conditions in North 
America actually improved in the run up to NAFTA’s adoption and continued 
thereafter.107 Other studies of the effects of trade liberalization on particular 
sectors have also concluded that although differences in environmental 
standards “may have been a factor” leading some U.S. companies to relocate to 
Mexico, “in general, there is little evidence that large-scale shifts in industrial 
investment and relocation to pollution havens have occurred.”108 As these 
studies have shown, companies do not migrate to take advantage of lax 
environmental standards because environmental compliance costs are, as a 
general rule, a small percentage of total operating costs.109 
Companies do, in fact, relocate.  However, they generally relocate for non-
environmental reasons, such as market access and lower labor costs. With 
respect to relocation to Mexico, the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment 
concluded that “the border area, with its low labor costs, proximity to the 
 
 106. G. Fredriksson & Daniel L. Millimet, Is There a Race to the Bottom in Environmental 
Policies?: The Effects of NAFTA, in CEC, THE ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF FREE TRADE 241, 
245 (2002).  See Claudia Schatan, The Environmental Impact of Mexican Manufacturing Exports 
under NAFTA, in GREENING NAFTA, supra note 13, at 147 (noting that Mexico increased 
foreign trade after NAFTA, but that [t]his increase in foreign trade . . . is not attributable to 
Mexico’s becoming a pollution haven” and that “Mexican trade trends do not suggest a shift of 
export specialization toward more polluting sectors after 1994”). 
 107. Fredriksson & Millimet, supra note 106, at 260. 
 108. U.S. CONGRESSIONAL OFFICE FOR TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, TRADE AND 
ENVIRONMENT: CONFLICTS AND OPPORTUNITIES, OTA-BP-ITE-94, 40 (1992) (studying data 
concerning the manufacturing sector). 
 109. In the United States, pollution abatement costs are generally small compared to total 
operating costs.  For example, pollution abatement costs for the tobacco products industry were 
just 0.12% of total costs; for the fabricated metals products, 0.42%; for petroleum and coal 
products, 1.93%; and for all industries evaluated, an average of 0.62%.  Håkan Nordström & 
Scott Vaughan, TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT 37 (WTO Publications 1999), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres99_e/environment.pdf. 
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United States, and duty-free export processing zones, has attracted many U.S. 
firms over the years.”110 
2. Scale Effects 
As with competitiveness effects, the CEC has helped to improve our 
knowledge of scale effects.  Not only has the CEC’s work focused attention on 
the type of information needed to evaluate scale effects, but it has also shown, 
along with others, important connections between trade and scale effects. 
Concerning the type of information needed to evaluate scale effects, the 
CEC Secretariat has noted that large-scale, or “macro,” studies of the 
environmental effects of trade “are only partially useful.”111  Although they 
may show “marginal” overall levels of environmental change at a global, 
continental or national level, they are unlikely to identify (and more likely to 
mask) environmental impacts in specific geographic locations. As a 
consequence, such macro studies must be “supported by more targeted and 
disaggregated indicators, including region-specific, environmental-media-
specific, and sector-specific analysis.”112 
These conclusions are extremely significant because even if trade 
liberalization has an overall positive environmental impact, it may result in 
substantial depletion of specific natural resources, such as fish or timber, or 
increases in air or water pollution in particular localities or in specific 
economic sectors.  For example, NAFTA has led to increased water pollution 
from nitrogen loading in areas of intensive farming.113 
Concerning actual scale effects, the work of the CEC has shown that the 
increased production, resource exploitation, transportation and energy needs 
that result from increased trade “pose serious challenges to environmental 
infrastructures and policy implementation.”114 Studies have shown, for 
example, that in Mexico’s agricultural sector, “scale effects of trade-related 
shifts to large-scale agri-business operations have not been offset by improved 
technologies or stronger regulations.”115  Overall, data show that in Mexico 
“environmental degradation has overwhelmed any benefits from trade-led 
economic growth.”116 
 
 110. TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT: CONFLICTS AND OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 108, at 8. 
 111. Vaughan & Block, supra note 104, at 25–26. 
 112. Id. at 26. 
 113. Vaughan, supra note 25, at 73. 
 114. Vaughan & Block, supra note 104, at 26. 
 115. Id.  See Vaughan, supra note 25, at 69–80. 
 116. Kevin P. Gallagher, Free Trade and the Environment: Mexico, NAFTA, and Beyond, 2 
(Interhemispheric Resource Center, Sept. 17, 2004). See CEC Secretariat, supra note 24, at 21–
22, 36 (describing the huge changes in demographics due to liberalization of the agricultural 
sector). 
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Moreover, contrary to the claims of trade proponents that trade will 
increase the demand for higher environmental standards, the CEC has found 
“little evidence to support the notion that greater revenues arising from trade 
expansion will be moved to bolster the resources of environmental authorities 
in order to address trade-related scale effects.”117  In fact, the CEC found that 
“the speed with which trade and other kinds of liberalization are proceeding 
appear to be overwhelming the capacity of domestic regulators generally (in 
the financial as well as environmental spheres) to ensure robust oversight of 
the course and consequences of changes markets.”118  Between 1988 and 1999, 
the period just before NAFTA when Mexico was liberalizing its markets and 
through the early years of NAFTA, Mexico’s GDP grew by thirty-eight 
percent.119  Nonetheless: 
rural soil erosion grew by 89 percent, municipal waste solid waste by 108 
percent, water pollution by 29 percent, and air pollution by 97 percent.  
Disaggregating air pollution, sulfur dioxide grew by 42 percent, nitrous oxides 
by 65 percent, hydrocarbons by 104 percent, carbon monoxide by 105 percent, 
and particulate matter by 43 percent.120 
These conclusions do not appear to be unique to NAFTA.  Instead, a 
consensus is building that “increased trade and growth without appropriate 
environmental policies in place may have unwanted effects on the 
environment.”121 
The importance of these conclusions from the NAFTA and NAAEC 
experience for future FTAs is clear: comprehensive and far-reaching 
environmental and development objectives “must be conceived of, and 
implemented, before agreeing to” liberalize trade.122 Moreover, without 
substantial assistance, developing countries are unlikely to “develop the 
necessary environmental policies to steer trade-led growth in a sustainable 
manner.”123 
3. Failures to Integrate Trade and Environmental Policies 
The CEC has made clear progress in assessing the scale effects of free 
trade and articulating the rationale for ensuring that adequate policies are in 
place for anticipating and preventing such impacts.  Nevertheless, governments 
 
 117. Vaughan & Block, supra note 104, at 26. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Kevin P. Gallagher, The CEC and Environmental Quality: Assessing the Mexican 
Experience, in GREENING NAFTA, supra note 13, at 117, 119. 
 120. Id. 
 121. PER FREDRIKSSON, TRADE, GLOBAL POLICY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 1 (1999). 
 122. Block, supra note 46, at 526. 
 123. Gallagher, supra note 119, at 125. 
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do not appear to be integrating trade and environmental policies as a result of 
such assessments.124  According to the CEC: 
To date, growth in trade has not been matched by a comparable growth in 
environmental protection policies.  In some instances, evidence to the contrary 
(that environmental expenditures have been reduced in tandem with trade 
liberalization) has led to increased environmental stress.  This is especially true 
in specific instances, such as absolute increases in economic scale and lagging 
investments in infrastructure, as well as in monitoring and enforcement. 
Among the most important challenges to the trade-environment debate is that 
of building opportunities for policy integration.125 
B. The Cooperative Work Program 
The incorporation of environmental considerations into NAFTA and 
NAAEC has clearly benefited the environment in both abstract and concrete 
ways.  Some argue that NAFTA is partially responsible for “the spread of mass 
public environmental concern in the three NAFTA countries [which] has 
generated a growing demand for and thus a governmental supply of such 
regulations.”126 While the United States has not seen more than relatively 
minor amendments to environmental law since the entry into force of NAFTA 
and NAAEC, Mexican environmentalists report that a citizen submission 
alleging the failure to enforce Mexico’s environmental impact assessment law 
in the construction of a pier in Cozumel had several environmental benefits, 
including the reform of Mexico’s environmental law.127  In addition, the 
NAAEC has elevated issues typically thought of as strictly domestic matters, 
such as enforcement, to international matters.128 
Moreover, the cooperative work program of the CEC has produced a 
number of strong environmental outcomes.  The CEC’s work on toxic 
chemicals has perhaps been the most successful program.  Through its North 
American Regional Action Plans (NARAPs), the three governments agree on 
strategies for managing chemicals. These NARAPs have successfully 
eliminated the use of chlordane and DDT,129 two potent pesticides, throughout 
 
 124. Id. at 27. 
 125. Id. 
 126. John J. Kirton, supra note 55, at 79. 
 127. Gustavo Alanís Ortega, Public Participation within NAFTA’s Environmental Agreement: 
The Mexican Experienced, in LINKING TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND SOCIAL COHESION: NAFTA 
EXPERIENCES, GLOBAL CHALLENGES 183, 184–185 (John J. Kirton & Virginia W. MacLaren 
eds., 2002). 
 128. John J. Kirton, supra note 55, at 79. 
 129. CEC North American Working Group for the Sound Management of Chemicals Task 
Force on DDT and Chlordane, North American Regional Plan on DDT (June 1997), available at 
http://www.cec.org/programs_projects/pollutants_health/smoc/ ddt.cfm?varlan=english. 
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North America.  The CEC is developing other NARAPS to reduce the impact 
of mercury130 and PCBs131 on the environment. 
In addition, the CEC has been instrumental in compiling comparable data 
from the Canadian, Mexican and U.S. Pollutant Release and Transfer 
Registries (PRTR) “to give a North American perspective of the amounts of 
chemicals released to the air, water, and land, and transferred off-site for 
recycling or other management.”132  While the United States and Canada have 
had PRTRs for some time (the Toxics Release Inventory under the U.S. 
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act133), only recently did 
Mexico finally mandate reporting of chemicals stored and released at specified 
facilities. 
The CEC has also produced the North American Atlas, an online 
information tool with maps, data and interactive map layers that allows users to 
view environmental issues on a continental scale.134 The atlas offers a 
consistent mapping framework for studying environmental issues, such as 
conservation planning, renewable energy capacity, pollution and other issues. 
Despite these notable successes, the cooperative work program is currently 
hampered by a shortage of funds; the CEC’s budget has been locked at $9 
million (although declining in real dollars due to inflation and currency 
exchange rates) since the CEC’s inception.  In fact, a properly funded CEC 
could be an important aspect of any effort to address scale effects from trade-
based growth or growth more generally.135  Nonetheless, the CEC has 
developed an impressive array of successes on a shoestring budget. 
C. Enforcement Matters 
The citizen submission process, in many ways, was the centerpiece of the 
NAAEC.  Citizens of any of the three Parties could allege that one of the three 
 
 130. CEC North American Implementation Task Force on Mercury, North American Action 
Plan on Mercury: Phase II (Mar. 16, 2000), available at http://www.cec.org/programs_projects/ 
pollutants_health/smoc/pdfs/Hgnarap.pdf 
 131. CEC PCB Task Force, PCB Regional Action Plan (Dec. 1996), available at 
http://www.cec.org/programs_projects/pollutants_health/smoc/pcb.cfm?varlan=english. 
 132. CEC, Taking Stock: 2004, http://www.cec.org/takingstock/takingstock.cfm?activityId=1 
1&varlan=English (last visited Oct. 30, 2008). 
 133. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001–11050, §§ 311–312. For more on the toxics release inventory, see 
Environmental Protection Agency, What Is the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) Program?, 
http://www.epa.gov/tri/triprogram/whatis.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2008). 
 134. Commission for Environmental Cooperation, Mapping North American Environmental 
Issues, www.cec.org/naatlas (last visited Oct. 30, 2008). 
 135. Professor John Knox, for example, has called the CEC, with its “broad scope, 
cooperative programs, objective reporting, and reliance on public participation,” as an “important 
precedent[] for other national and international institutions devoted to sustainable development.”  
John H. Knox, The Judicial Resolution of Conflicts Between Trade and the Environment, 28 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 78 (2004). 
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governments was failing to enforce environmental law effectively. For 
Mexican citizens, where options for redress of environmental matters are rare, 
the citizen submission process provided the possibility for bringing 
environmental issues to the attention of an international institution.136 
The rigorous and professional manner in which the Secretariat has 
reviewed submissions137 has been instrumental in ensuring the integrity of the 
process. Nonetheless, actions and decisions of the Council have eroded public 
confidence in the process,138 leading the former director of the CEC’s unit on 
Submissions on Enforcement Matters to declare that the submissions process—
frequently referred to as the “teeth” of the NAAEC—suffers from “tooth 
decay.”139  The Council has sought to whittle away at the independence of the 
Secretariat by determining the scope of proposed factual records, a role 
designated to the Secretariat.  In the case of the Migratory Birds submission, 
submitters requested that the Secretariat prepare a factual record concerning 
the nationwide failure of the United States to enforce the Migratory Bird 
Treaty Act (MBTA) against loggers,140 and the Secretariat agreed that such a 
 
 136. For a review of actual use of the citizen submission process by citizens, see David L. 
Markell, Understanding Citizen Perspectives on Government Decision Making Processes as a 
Way to Improve the Administrative State, 36 ENVTL. L. 651 (2006). 
 137. Wold et al., supra note 17, at 421 (“Scholars, NAAEC review committees, and members 
of the public are virtually unanimous in applauding the Secretariat’s rigorous review of 
submissions for eligibility and for determination on whether a factual record is warranted.”).  
Accord John H. Knox, A New Approach to Compliance with International Environmental Law: 
The Submissions Procedure of the NAFTA Environmental Commission, 28 ECOLOGY L. Q. 1, 96–
97 (2001) (stating that the Secretariat “has not shown any particular deference to states’ suggested 
interpretations of the [NAAEC] Agreement.  Conversely, it has dismissed submissions—even by 
major environmental groups—that did not meet the requirements for admissibility.  In short, the 
Secretariat’s decisions appear to be consistently grounded on carefully reasoned legal 
interpretations of the [NAAEC] Agreement rather than on fear of adverse reactions by, or the 
desire to carry favor with, either states or submitters.”); Markell, supra note 136, at 693–694 
(noting that, although the Secretariat has served as a “vigilant filter,” anecdotal evidence “reflects 
confidence in the Secretariat’s neutrality and trust in its performance”).  In addition, a review of 
the Independent Review Committee concluded that: 
The record on the submissions that have been subject to Secretariat decisions to date 
appears to show a consistent and well reasoned group of decisions.  While observers (and 
the Parties) may, and some certainly have, criticized specific decisions, this Committee 
has seen nothing to suggest that the decisions of the Secretariat lack proper foundation.” 
Independent Review Committee, supra note 57, § 3.3.3. 
 138. See Letter from Randy L. Christensen, Sierra Legal Defense Fund, to CEC Council 
(Mar. 6, 2002), available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/JPAC/Sierra_to_Council-BCMining.pdf 
(stating that the Council’s actions could “threaten to strip the citizen submission process of its 
integrity, utility and legitimacy”). 
 139. Garver, supra note 17. 
 140. Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–712 (2000).  The MBTA 
implements four international treaties, including agreements with Canada and Mexico, aimed at 
protecting migratory birds.  Section 703 of the MBTA prohibits any person from killing or 
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factual record was warranted.141  The Council, in an arbitrary and unexplained 
fashion, decided that the Secretariat could only investigate the failure to 
enforce the MBTA with respect to two minor examples (but not examples 
provided in which thousands of birds were likely taken) provided by submitters 
merely to illustrate a pattern of widespread government conduct.  Because the 
Migratory Birds submitters found the citizen submission process attractive 
“only because of its capacity to investigate the United State’s broad pattern of 
nonenforcement of the MBTA,”142 the Council’s decision effectively neutered 
the submission. 
Further evidence of the Council’s effort to undermine the citizen 
submission process and erode the Secretariat’s independence can be found in 
the Ontario Logging submission.143 After the Secretariat determined that the 
submission contained sufficient information to warrant the development of a 
factual record, the Council remanded the submission to the submitters by 
deeming the submission as containing insufficient information.144  Submitters 
had presented data from computer models estimating that more than 85,000 
bird nests would be destroyed by logging operations in violation of Canada’s 
 
“taking” migratory birds, including the destruction of nests, the crushing of eggs and the killing 
of nestlings and fledglings, “by any means or in any manner,” unless the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service (FWS) issues a valid permit.  The United States has never prosecuted a logger or logging 
company for a violation of the MBTA, even though it acknowledges that the MBTA has 
consistently been violated by persons logging on federal and non-federal land.  In fact, the 
Director of the FWS has stated that the FWS, the agency responsible for enforcement of the 
MBTA, “has had a longstanding, unwritten policy relative to the MBTA that no enforcement or 
investigative action should be taken in incidents involving logging operations, that result in the 
taking of non-endangered, non-threatened, migratory birds and/or their nests.”  Memorandum 
from U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to Service Enforcement Officers, MBTA Enforcement 
Policy (Mar. 7, 1996), available at http://www.cec.org. 
 141. CEC Secretariat, Article 15(1) Notification to Council that Development of a Factual 
Record is Warranted, A14/SEM/99-002/11/ADV (Dec. 15, 2000) (SEM 99-002), available at 
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/ACFA30.pdf [hereinafter Migratory Birds—Notification to 
Council]. 
 142. Wold et al., supra note 17, at 426.  For a discussion of how the factual record might have 
differed based on the scope requested by submitters and recommended by the Secretariat, see id. 
at 427–429. 
 143. Submission to the Commission on Environmental Cooperation (Ontario Logging), 
A14/SEM/02-001/01/SUB (Feb. 6, 2002) (SEM-02-001) [hereinafter Ontario Logging 
Submission]. 
 144. CEC, Council Res. 03-05, CEC, C/C.01/03-02/RES/05/final (Apr. 22, 2003), available 
at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/02-1-RES-E.pdf. The Council questioned the sufficiency 
with the use of a statistical model that submitters contend provides the best available information 
precisely because the government of Canada has abdicated its enforcement responsibilities by, 
among other things, failing to collect the kind of information required to assess the impact of 
commercial logging on bird populations protected by the Migratory Bird Treaty Act. 
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migratory bird regulations.145  Yet, Council, at Canada’s behest, demanded that 
submitters provide data that logging actually destroyed bird nests.146 
Even where the Council’s actions do not undermine the Secretariat, they 
undermine the citizen submission process.  For example, Council has ignored 
the advice of the JPAC concerning implementation of the submission 
process.147  In perhaps the “most serious current threat to the CEC submission 
process,”148 Council has long delayed votes on the preparation of factual 
records. For example, more than two and a half years passed before Council 
approved the Secretariat’s recommendation to prepare a factual record in Coal-
Fired Power Plants.149  More than three years passed before Council approved 
the preparation of a factual record in Lake Chapala II.150  Delays of this nature 
obviously dampen public enthusiasm for the submission process151 by 
eliminating any possibility to meaningfully redress nonenforcement problems 
 
 145. Ontario Logging Submission, supra note 143, at 4–5. 
 146. See Canada, Response to Submission SEM-02-01, A14/SEM/02-001/12/RSP, 5 (Apr. 11, 
2002); Council Resolution 03-05, supra note 144.  After the submitters provided additional data, 
the Secretariat again determined that the preparation of a factual record was warranted, the 
Council agreed, and the Secretariat prepared a factual record.  For a history of this dispute, as 
well as all decisional documents, including the factual record, see CEC.org, Ontario Logging, 
http://www.cec.org/citizen/submissions/details/index.cfm?varlan=english&ID=70. 
 147. JPAC “may provide advice to the Council on any matter within the scope of this 
agreement . . . and on the implementation and further elaboration of this agreement, and may 
perform such other functions as the Council may direct.” NAAEC, supra note 5, art. 16(4).  For 
an example of JPAC advice to Council on the citizen submission process, see Joint Public 
Advisory Committee, Advice to Council No. 03-05, Dec. 17, 2003, Re: Limiting the Scope of 
Factual Records and Review of the Operation of CEC Council Resolution 00-09 related to 
Articles 14 and 15 of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, available at 
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/ABOUTUS/Advice03-05_EN.pdf 
 148. Garver, supra note 17, at 38. 
 149. Friends of the Earth Canada et al., Coal-fired Power Plants—Submission, SEM-04-005 
(Sept. 20, 2004).  The submitters asserted that the United States is failing to effectively enforce 
the U.S. Clean Water Act against coal-fired power plants for mercury emissions that are allegedly 
degrading thousands of rivers, lakes and other waterbodies across the United States.  The 
Secretariat determined that a factual record was warranted on December 5, 2005.  Secretariat, 
Article 15(1) Notification to Council that Development of a Factual Record is Warranted, Coal-
fired Power Plants, A14/SEM/04-005/48/ADV (Dec. 5, 2005).  On June 23, the Council finally 
recommended the preparation of a factual record. Council Resolution 08-03, C/C.01/08/RES/ 
03/Final (June 23, 2008). For all the documents relating to this submission, see CEC.org, Coal-
fired Power Plants, http://www.cec.org/citizen/submissions/details/index.cfm?varlan=english& 
ID=103 (last visited Oct. 30, 2008). 
 150. The Secretariat recommended the preparation of a factual record on May 18, 2005. 
Council voted to instruct the Secretariat to develop a factual record on May 30, 2008. For a 
timeline for this submission, SEM-03-003, see CEC.org, Lake Chapala II, http://www.cec.org/ 
citizen/submissions/details/index.cfm?varlan=english&ID=90 (last visited Oct. 30, 2008). 
 151. Garver, supra note 17, at 38. 
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as well as by underscoring the Council’s unwillingness to take the process and 
the submitters seriously. 
In another case, BC-Mining, Canada initiated administrative actions after 
the submission was filed in order to quash it.152  While the initiation of an 
administrative action would normally be a positive outcome of the submission 
process, it was clear from the beginning that the administrative actions were a 
sham; Canada has not taken action to compel compliance with the relevant 
fisheries laws.153 
Lastly, the factual records culminate in nothing more than the factual 
record—the NAAEC does not require governments to address issues raised in 
the factual record.  Thus, the factual record is a dead end.  In the United States, 
the Migratory Birds submission has resulted in no changes in the way the Fish 
and Wildlife Service implements the Migratory Bird Treaty Act.154  Council 
 
 152. Article 14(3)(a) of the NAAEC directs the Secretariat to halt a factual inquiry when the 
matter is subject to pending judicial or administrative proceedings NAAEC, supra note 5, art. 
14(3)(a). 
 153. BC Mining was submitted in June 1998.  Sierra Club of British Columbia, et al., A 
Submission to the Commission on Environmental Cooperation Pursuant to Article 14 of the North 
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, BC Mining—Submission, SEM/98-004/06, 
CEC, (June 1998) (SEM 98-004), available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/98-4-SUB-E.pdf.  
Canada sent letters to the owners of the Mt. Washington mine, used as an example of Canada’s 
widespread failure to enforce the Fisheries Act, on July 30, 1999.  See Canada, BC Mining—
Party Response, SEM/98-004/06/RSP, CEC, (Sept. 8, 1999) (SEM 98-004), available at 
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/sem/98-4-RSP-E.pdf. On September 28, 1998, Canada sent a 
“warning letter” to the owner of the Tulsequah Chief Mine, also used by submitters to illustrate 
Canada’s pattern of non-enforcement.  Id. at 5–6, 24.  Canada claimed that the warning letter 
constituted a “pending judicial or administrative proceeding.”  Id. at 25.  Because of Canada’s 
action, the two mines were removed from consideration in the factual record.  Council Res. 01-11, 
CEC, C/C.01/01-06/RES/05/Final (Nov. 16, 2001), available at http://www.cec.org/files/ 
PDF/COUNCIL/res01-11e.pdf. The transparent nature of these sham administrative actions, 
however, is manifest; the two-year limitation under Canadian law to bring summary conventions 
had already expired and Canada failed to respond to this concern of submitters.  Moreover, a 
conservation group reports that Canada has made no progress to eliminate acid mine drainage at 
the Tulsequah mine, one of the mine sites eliminated from consideration due to Canada’s 
administrative action. Environmental Law Institute, Final Report:  Issues Related to Articles 14 
and 15 of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation 17 (2003) (citing Letter 
from Transboundary Watershed Alliance to Joint Public Advisory Committee (Sept. 16, 2003)) 
[hereinafter ELI Report], available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/ABOUTUS/ELI-Art14-15-
Report-Final-5_en.pdf. 
 154. The International Environmental Law Project (IELP) submitted requests for information 
concerning any actions following up on the Migratory Birds submission.  The Forest Service 
responded that they had no records responsive to the request. See, e.g., Letter from Corbin L. 
Newman, Jr., Director of Forest Management, U.S. Department of Agriculture, to Erica J. 
Thorson, IELP (Nov. 8, 2007) (on file with author). The Fish & Wildlife Service provided one 
record of enforcement of the MBTA against a person who cut down a tree with one red-tailed 
hawk in it but no information relating to changes in policy to enforce the MBTA against loggers. 
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has also indicated its unwillingness to evaluate implementation of factual 
records. When the JPAC recently indicated that it would undertake a review of 
“progress made in addressing the enforcement issues identified in a factual 
record,”155 Council admonished the JPAC by “clarify[ing]” that the NAAEC 
submissions process “does not contemplate any action by the Secretariat or the 
Council after the publication of a factual record.”156  Concerning JPAC’s 
desire to undertake a yearly initiative to review published factual records, 
Council added that “any such action would be beyond the scope of the 
NAAEC.” 
In sum, the member governments, individually or through the Council, 
have chosen to treat the citizen submission process as an adversarial, rather 
than a cooperative, process.  The manner in which the Parties and the Council 
have eroded the credibility of the process indicates that it may not be the most 
appropriate model for future FTAs. 
D. The Secretariat’s Independent Reports 
Article 13 reports are intended to highlight some aspect of the North 
American environment worthy of review.  The Secretariat has used this 
authority judiciously, preparing only six Article 13 reports.  These have 
included the investigation of site-specific problems, such as the investigation 
into the deaths of 40,000 migratory birds in Guanajuato, Mexico,157 border 
issues, such as the report on threats to migratory bird habitat in the San Pedro 
River Basin,158 and continent-wide concerns, such as the study to assess long-
range transport of atmospheric pollutants159 and environmental challenges 
posed by the North American electricity market.160 
The authority of the Secretariat to develop these reports has proved to be 
very valuable.161 The report on long-range pollutants helped facilitate 
negotiations by the NAAEC Parties for the Stockholm Convention on 
 
Letter from Kevin R. Adams, Chief, Office of Law Enforcement, Fish & Wildlife Service, to 
Erica J. Thorson, IELP (July 10, 2006) (on file with author). 
 155. JPAC, Advice to Council No.: 08-01, Re: Submissions on Enforcement Matters: Lessons 
Learned to Following up Factual Records (Feb. 27, 2008). 
 156. Letter from David McGovern, Alternative Representative for Canada (on behalf of 
Council), to Ms. Jane Gardner, JPAC Chair (Apr. 16, 2008). 
 157. CEC Secretariat, Report on the Death of Migratory Birds at the Silva Reservoir (1995). 
 158. CEC Secretariat, Ribbon of Life: An Agenda for Preserving Transboundary Bird Habitat 
on the Upper San Pedro River (1999). 
 159. CEC Secretariat, Continental Pollutant Pathways: An Agenda for Cooperation to 
Address Long-Range Transport of Air Pollution in North America (1997). 
 160. CEC Secretariat, Environmental Challenges and Opportunities of the Evolving North 
American Electricity Market (June 2002). 
 161. For a report-by-report assessment of the beneficial outcomes of the Article 13 reports, 
see David A. Wirth, supra note 99. 
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Persistent Organic Pollutants,162 now a major multilateral environmental 
agreement that protects human health and the environment from persistent 
organic pollutants.163  The San Pedro Report galvanized public support for the 
watershed and led the United States and Mexico to develop a Memorandum of 
Understanding to work together to protect the Upper San Pedro watershed.164 
Nonetheless, Mexico viewed the first Article 13 report, an analysis of why 
40,000 birds died at the La Silva Reservoir in Mexico (they died of bacterial 
infections resulting from agricultural runoff), as being decided “against” it.165  
(In fact, Mexico considered the entire environmental side agreement as 
adversarial because no equivalent agreement was negotiated for NAFTA’s 
precursor, the U.S.-Canada FTA.166)  Similarly, the United States viewed the 
Article 13 report on genetically modified maize, which found genetically 
modified maize in Mexico despite a Mexican import ban on it, as an 
indictment of U.S. policies that promote genetically modified agricultural 
crops. The United States called the report “methodologically ‘fundamentally 
flawed and unscientific.’”167  Mexico disagreed with the report’s 
conclusions.168 
While acknowledging the Secretariat’s independence on Article 13 
matters, particularly those relating to the annual program and not subject to 
Council approval, the Parties have resisted that independence. In a review of 
the implementation of Article 13, Professor David Wirth reports that 
“[c]onsultations with the Parties have tended over time to become more 
extensive and more formal . . . perhaps even inconsistent with the structure and 
intent of Article 13.169  Nonetheless, the Parties have come to expect such 
consultation. Recognizing the backlash against the Secretariat, Wirth 
recommends that to preserve the Secretariat’s independence on Article 13 
matters, “the Secretariat should—as it has—conduct consultations with the 
Parties on the express understanding that this is a courtesy on the part of the 
Secretariat.”170 
 
 162. WOLD, GAINES & BLOCK, supra note 27, at 823. 
 163. Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, May 22, 2001, 40 I.L.M. 532 
(2001), available at http://www.pops.int. 
 164. WOLD, GAINES & BLOCK, supra note 27, at 824. 
 165. Independent Review Committee, supra note 57, at 8. 
 166. Id. at 8–9. 
 167. United States, U.S. Government Comments to the Secretariat’s Draft Article 13 Report 
Maize and Biodiversity: The Effects of Transgenic Maize in Mexico (July 23, 2004), in CEC 
Secretariat, Maize & Biodiversity: The Effects of Transgenic Maize in Mexico, Key Findings and 
Recommendations, Attachment (2004) [hereinafter Maize & Biodiversity]. 
 168. David A. Wirth, supra note 99, at 18–19. 
 169. Id. at 29. 
 170. Id. 
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IV.  AFTER THE NAAEC: DR-CAFTA AND BEYOND 
The development of an international institution, complete with processes 
for citizen participation in enforcement matters, provides a tantalizing model 
for replication in other trade regimes.  While some elements of the NAAEC 
regime could provide “inspiration to integrate nontrade issues”171 in trade 
regimes, it is not clear that the NAAEC model can or should be replicated.  As 
noted above, the NAAEC focuses on competitiveness and enforcement 
concerns even though the empirical evidence does not suggest these are major 
worries.  Where the NAAEC has proved to be most innovative and where it 
could produce significant and positive environmental outcomes, the NAAEC 
Parties have used flawed institutional structures to mitigate those benefits.  For 
example, the Parties have taken a dim view to citizens shining a light on their 
failures to enforce environmental law and reduced the importance of the citizen 
submission process.  They have also tired of the Secretariat’s independence 
and have formalized structures to limit that independence. 
Nonetheless, with few models to choose from, the United States has 
latched unto the basic NAAEC model without evaluating its strengths and 
weaknesses172 for post-NAAEC FTAs.  Not only is the competitiveness/ 
enforcement focus less relevant than a focus on scale, but the environmental, 
political, institutional and social circumstances of many of the countries with 
which the United States has negotiated FTAs do not lend themselves to some 
aspects of the NAAEC model. 
To the extent that the United States has negotiated changes to NAAEC-
inspired provisions, it has done so largely to retain greater political control 
rather than improve trade-environment linkages.  For example, many FTAs 
have eliminated the Secretariat, thereby eliminating any possibility for 
independent reports to be produced on environmental issues within the scope 
of the FTA. Not all changes have weakened trade-environment linkages, 
however.  As described more fully in Section V, the U.S.-Peru FTA 
acknowledges the specific environmental and social contexts of Peru—
particularly in the forest sector—and attempts to address the problems through 
detailed forest-specific provisions. While that FTA does not require any 
 
 171. Pierre Marc Johnson, From Trade Liberlisation to Sustainable Development: The 
Challenges of Integrated Global Governance, in LINKING TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND SOCIAL 
COHESION: NAFTA EXPERIENCES, GLOBAL CHALLENGES supra note 127, at 34. 
 172. See Block, supra note 46, at 514 (noting that in the context of a Free Trade Area of the 
Americas (FTAA), policy makers must “attempt to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the 
NAAEC as one of the few models potentially applicable to the greater hemisphere in the 
FTAA”). Negotiations over the hemisphere-wide FTAA have since floundered for reasons largely 
relating to agricultural subsidies.  See Garver, supra note 17, at 39 (concluding that “[i]t is clear 
that environmental mechanisms in the NAFTA package have not met their promise or potential, 
and yet they are being duplicated with little analysis or meaningful modification”). 
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changes before the FTA comes into force, it is at least a step towards 
rethinking the environment in the context of trade. 
A. Embracing the NAAEC’s Enforcement Model 
1. Enforcement of Environmental Laws 
All of the FTAs negotiated subsequent to NAFTA and the NAAEC start, 
like the NAAEC, by committing the Parties to ensure that their domestic 
environmental laws provide for high levels of environmental protection and to 
strive to continue to improve such laws.173 In these FTAs, the Parties also 
recognize that it is “inappropriate to encourage trade and investment by 
weakening or reducing the protections afforded in domestic environmental 
laws.”174 Most of these FTAs make these obligations enforceable through 
dispute settlement procedures175 or through consultations, as under DR-
CAFTA.176  The FTAs also provide that a Party “shall not fail to effectively 
enforce its environmental laws, through a sustained or recurring course of 
action or inaction, in a manner affecting trade between the Parties.”177  These 
obligations are also subject to dispute settlement.178 
 
 173. See, e.g., U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 22, art. 18.1: 
Recognizing the sovereign right of each Party to establish its own levels of domestic 
environmental protection and environmental development priorities, and to adopt or 
modify accordingly its environmental laws and policies, each Party shall strive to ensure 
that those laws and policies provide for and encourage high levels of environmental 
protection and shall strive to continue to improve its respective levels of environmental 
protection. 
Almost identical language is found in other FTAs.  See, e.g., United States-Australia Free Trade 
Agreement, U.S.-Austl., art. 19.1, May 19, 2004, 43 I.L.M. 1248 [hereinafter U.S.-Australia 
FTA], available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Australia_FTA/Final_ 
Text/asset_upload_file148_5168.pdf; United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Chile, art. 
19.1, June 6, 2003, 42 I.L.M. 1026 [hereinafter U.S.-Chile FTA], available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Chile_FTA/Final_Texts/asset_upload_fil
e535_3989.pdf; Agreement between the Government of  the United States and the Government of 
the Kingdom of Bahrain on the Establishment of a Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Bahr., art. 16.1, 
Sept. 14, 2004, 44 I.L.M. 544 (2005) [hereinafter U.S.-Bahrain FTA], available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Bahrain_FTA/final_texts/Section_Index.html; 
DR-CAFTA, supra note 20, art. 17.1. 
 174. U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 173, art. 19.2(2).  See also U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 22, 
art. 18.3(2); DR-CAFTA, supra note 20, art. 17.2(2); U.S.-Australia FTA, supra note 173 art. 
19.2; U.S.-Bahrain FTA, supra note 173, art. 16.2(2). 
 175. U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 173, art. 19.6.  See also U.S.-Australia FTA, supra note 173, 
art. 19.7. 
 176. DR-CAFTA, supra note 20, art. 17.10.  See also U.S.-Bahrain FTA, supra note 173, art. 
16.8. 
 177. U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 173, art. 19.2(1)(a). See also DR-CAFTA, supra note 20, 
art. 18.2(1)(a); U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 22, art. 18.3(1)(a).  In the case of Australia, where 
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Because these provisions are included in the FTA itself, rather than a “side 
agreement,” the United States has championed such provisions as further 
integration of trade and the environment.179  Because there is no legal 
difference between placing the environmental provisions in a side agreement 
or in the FTA itself, this benefit is more imagined than real. More 
fundamentally, there is, of course, nothing inherently wrong with guarding 
against efforts to weaken environmental law to attract investment and 
encourage trade.  However, these provisions are unlikely to yield benefits.  As 
noted above, little, if any, evidence suggests that companies move to countries 
with weak environmental laws or that countries weaken their environmental 
laws to increase trade or attract investment.180 
In addition, because these provisions have never been invoked in the 
NAAEC or in an FTA, it is questionable whether a government sanctions 
process to address environmental matters would encourage cooperation on 
environmental matters.  Indeed, fearing that a sanctions process would be 
counterproductive, a high-level expert group formally recommended in 2004 
that “the [NAAEC] Parties publicly commit to refrain from invoking [the 
dispute settlement provisions] for a period of 10 years.”181  Nevertheless, the 
United States claims that the “mere existence of this enforcement tool helps to 
ensure full implementation of FTA environmental obligations even if no 
disputes have been brought to date.”182 
If the government sanctions processes in the NAAEC and subsequent 
FTAs are any indication, the dispute settlement provisions to address 
environmental matters will remain dormant.  Unless real and measurable 
competitiveness issues arise from a failure to enforce environmental law, a 
Party to an FTA is unlikely to view that failure as raising vital interests worth 
litigating.183  The potential harm to relations with trading partners and fears of 
retaliation make litigation over the “amorphous benefits of enforcement” 
unattractive.184 
 
many environmental matters are the responsibility of the States, these obligations extend to 
relevant federal and state laws.  U.S.-Australia FTA, supra note 173, art. 19.2(1)(a). 
 178. U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 173, art. 19.6.  See U.S.-Australia FTA, supra note 173, art. 
19.7; U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 22, art. 18.12; DR-CAFTA, supra note 20, art. 17.10(7). 
 179. Mark Linscott, Demonstrable Benefits, 25 ENVIRONMENTAL F. 39, 39 (2008). The 
author is the Assistant United States Trade Representative for Environment and Natural 
Resources and has responsibility for all U.S. trade and environment matters. 
 180. See supra Section II.A. 
 181. TRAC, supra note 102, at 55. 
 182. Linscott, supra note 179, at 39. 
 183. See Yang, supra note 18, at 482 (noting that the failure to use the NAAEC’s sanctions 
process is consistent with the public choice of enforcement). 
 184. Id. 
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2. Citizen Submissions on Failures to Enforce Environmental Laws 
Although the United States has negotiated general enforcement provisions 
similar to the NAAEC’s, it has altered course with respect to the citizen 
submission process.  The citizen submission process has been characterized as 
“the unprecedented commitment by the three [NAAEC] governments to 
account internationally for the enforcement of their environmental laws,”185 
and it thus could be considered the centerpiece of any effort to prevent 
competitiveness effects. Nonetheless, FTAs with Australia, Chile, Jordan and 
Morocco, among others, do not include a citizen submission process.  Only the 
DR-CAFTA,186 Colombia,187 Panama188 and Peru189 FTAs include a citizen 
submission process. 
Even where these FTAs have included a submissions process, they have 
largely incorporated all the institutional flaws of the NAAEC model. As a 
consequence, as in the NAAEC, there are no checks on the Council’s powers 
to overrule the decisions of the Secretariat.  Similarly, the FTAs do not impose 
deadlines for Council to act on recommendations of the Secretariat.  They do, 
however, require preparation of a factual record with the assent of a single 
Party, unlike the supermajority the NAAEC requires.190 
Perhaps most important, the citizen submission processes of FTAs are 
likely to be adversarial rather than cooperative, just as in the NAAEC. In the 
context of DR-CAFTA, with its history of violence and repressive regimes, 
this characteristic is likely to stifle use of the citizen submission process.191  To 
date, only one submission has been brought, and that was by the Humane 
Society of the United States,192 a U.S.-based nongovernmental organization 
with a U.S. government contract to perform DR-CAFTA-related activities.  
 
 185. TRAC, supra note 102, at 4. 
 186. DR-CAFTA, supra note 20, arts. 17.7–17.8. 
 187. U.S.-Colombia FTA, supra note 21, arts. 18.8–18.9. 
 188. United States-Panama Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Pan., arts. 17.8–17.9, Jun. 28, 
2007 [hereinafter U.S.-Panama FTA], available at http://ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/ 
Panama_FTA/Final_Text/Section_Index.html. 
 189. U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 22, arts. 18.8–18.9. 
 190. See, e.g., DR-CAFTA, supra note 20, art. 17.8.2; U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 22, art. 
18.9.2 
 191. In September 2008, for example, Yuri Melini, the Director General of the Center for 
Environmental, Social and Environmental Action (CALAS) in Guatemala, was shot outside the 
home of a relative as he was getting out of his car. The attack was not random. Prior to opening 
fire, the gunman called out Mr. Melini’s name. Mr. Melini is a well-known environmental 
advocate in Guatemala who, in the week before the attack, published a column calling attention to 
threats against human rights and environmental advocates.  See Jim Loughran, Guatemala: 
Assassination Attempt Against Human Rights Defender Yuri Melini, Sept. 11, 2008, 
http://www.frontlinedefenders.org/node/1565. 
 192. Secretaria de Integración Económica Centroamericana, DR-CAFTA, available at 
http://www.sieca.org.gt/site/Enlaces.aspx?ID=003008 (last visited Oct. 30, 2008). 
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The U.S. State Department is currently seeking organizations to work with 
Central American organizations to prepare enforcement submissions. 
The more recent FTAs also eliminate some of the NAAEC’s more 
important elements.  For example, none of the FTAs establish a JPAC or 
similar independent voice authorized by the FTA itself to provide advice to the 
Council and the Secretariat.  That independent voice has been essential for 
highlighting Council proposals to limit the independence of the CEC 
Secretariat.  In a formal review of the NAAEC, the review committee noted: 
More so than any NGO could, JPAC can observe and remain up-to-date on 
CEC issues. Its direct access to the Council and the Secretariat helps keep the 
Parties and executive director responsive to their constituencies in a way that a 
broader, more generalized public discourse could not.193 
The failure of FTAs to include an independent body like the JPAC acting as 
the “intermediary between the Council and the concerned public”194 and the 
“public conscience”195 of the CEC is a real loss for subsequent FTAs. The 
absence of anything similar to the JPAC in subsequent FTAs suggests that the 
United States and its trading partners want as little public oversight as possible. 
B. New Institutional Arrangements 
Although the substantive provisions of post-NAAEC FTAs mirror those of 
the NAAEC, the institutional structures have changed. The independence of a 
Secretariat has been eliminated or sharply limited, and much more 
government-centered commissions have emerged. 
1. The Elimination of a Quasi-Independent Secretariat 
Despite the widespread view that the NAAEC was innovative and 
revolutionary (in large part due to the quasi-independent role of the 
Secretariat), none of the post-NAAEC FTAs creates a quasi-independent 
Secretariat to address or coordinate environmental issues among the Parties.  
DR-CAFTA196 and the other Latin American FTAs197 that include a citizen 
submission process establish Secretariats, but their mandates are limited solely 
to reviewing citizen submissions alleging failures to enforce environmental law 
 
 193. TRAC, supra note 102, at 34. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. See Agreement Establishing a Secretariat for Environmental Matters under the 
Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (2006), available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Regional/CAFTA/Section_Index.html. 
 197. U.S.-Colombia FTA, supra note 21, art. 18.8; U.S.-Panama FTA, supra note 188, art. 
17.8; U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 22, art. 18.8.  In each case, the Parties will designate the 
Secretariat through a exchange of letters or other agreement. 
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effectively.198  As under DR-CAFTA, where the Parties requested that the 
Secretariat de Integracióon Económica Centroamericana (SIECA)199 establish 
the Secretariat, the other FTAs will likely establish a Secretariat within an 
existing organization. 
The failure to include a quasi-independent Secretariat rests in large part 
with the lack of trust that the United States has in the CEC’s Secretariat.  
Ironically, that mistrust developed as the Secretariat assumed greater 
responsibility and independence due to a vacuum created by the Council and 
the NAAEC Parties. Initially, the NAAEC’s Council was not organized.  
Indeed, because of low interest or other events that required greater attention, 
the Secretariat prepared the initial work program with almost no input from the 
governments.200  With little guidance from the Council, the Secretariat “spent 
the first several years deliberately testing various areas of activity listed in the 
NAAEC,” eventually choosing the work program and its main themes.201  As a 
consequence of this inattention, the Council encouraged a very independent 
Secretariat. 
In addition to this lack of attention within the CEC, the NAAEC Parties 
were not organized internally.  This came to a head when the Secretariat 
released the “Maize Report,” which looked into the impacts of genetically 
modified corn on native varieties of maize in Mexico.202  In criticizing the 
Secretariat, the United States claimed that “[t]he process used to prepare this 
draft report would have benefited from greater transparency and 
communication to the Parties as to the intended scope, timeline and peer 
review procedures of the draft report.”203 In truth, the Secretariat had been 
consulting with many members of the U.S. government—those with relevant 
expertise—but those communications were apparently not known to EPA 
decisionmakers.  A report of the implementation of Article 13 details the many 
communications between the Secretariat and the Parties, including the refusal 
by the United States to have the Secretariat brief it on the process, draft report, 
and the report’s recommendations.204 
 
 198. Agreement Establishing a Secretariat for Environmental Matters, supra note 196, art. 5. 
 199. SIECA is a regional institution based in Guatemala that provides advice on technical and 
administrative aspects of economic integration within Central America.  SIECA, “Que es 
SIECA?”, http://www.sieca.org.gt/site/VisorDocs.aspx?IDDOC=Cache/17990000000002/179900 
00000002.swf (last visited Oct. 30, 2008). 
 200. TRAC, supra note 102, at 10. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Maize & Biodiversity, supra note 167. 
 203. United States, U.S. Government Comments to the Secretariat’s Draft Article 13 Report 
Maize and Biodiversity: The Effects of Transgenic Maize in Mexico (July 23, 2004), in Maize & 
Biodiversity, supra note 167, at Attachment. 
 204. David A. Wirth, supra note 99, at 16. 
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In the ensuing backlash, a great mistrust has developed between the Parties 
and the Secretariat.  The United States has responded by seeking to micro-
manage the CEC Secretariat.  It has also reacted by omitting any Secretariat in 
many subsequent FTAs and, where a Secretariat is contemplated, eliminating 
much of the independence that the CEC Secretariat has.  As a consequence, the 
great strength of the Secretariat to act as a neutral forum for the discussion of 
issues has been lost.205 
2. Two New Institutional Approaches 
In the absence of a Secretariat to propose a work program and undertake 
other substantive and administrative tasks, as under the NAAEC, the United 
States has adopted two different institutional models. With distant trading 
partners, such as Australia and Bahrain, the FTAs do not include any 
commission at all to coordinate environmental activities.  Instead, these FTAs 
create a “joint committee” composed of governmental trade officials to oversee 
implementation of the FTA.206  The joint committee may, if it so chooses, 
create a subcommittee on environmental matters.207 They also call for separate 
agreements or joint statements on environmental cooperation through which 
the Parties will explore ways to cooperate on environmental matters and 
strengthen their capacity to protect the environment.208 
While the distance between two trading partners may eliminate 
transboundary effects from trade, such as increased pollution along the U.S-
Mexico border from additional cross-border trucking,209 distance itself does 
not insulate a country from the environmental effects of trade. Even at 
 
 205. Janine Ferretti, Innovations in Managing Globalization: Lessons from the North 
American Experience, 15 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 367 (2003) (describing the value of the 
CEC Secretariat as a neutral forum for discussing trade-environment issues). 
 206. See, e.g., U.S.-Australia FTA, supra note 173, art. 19.5; U.S.-Bahrain FTA, supra note 
173, art. 16.5.  Some FTAs, such as the U.S.-Jordan FTA, do not expressly state that the Joint 
Committee may wish to establish a subcommittee on environmental matters, but such authority is 
inherent in the Joint Committee’s authority to “establish and delegate responsibilities to ad hoc 
and standing committees or working groups.”  United States-Jordan Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-
Jordan FTA, art. 15.3.b, Oct. 24, 2000, available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/ 
Bilateral/Jordan/Section_Index.html. 
 207. U.S.-Australia FTA, supra note 173, art. 19.5.1; U.S.-Bahrain FTA, supra note 173, art. 
16.5.1. 
 208. See, e.g., U.S.-Australia FTA, art. 19.5.1; United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement, 
U.S.-Morocco, art. 17.3.3, June 15, 2004, 44 I.L.M. 544 [hereinafter U.S.-Morocco FTA], 
available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Morocco_FTA/Final_Text-Section 
_Index.html. 
 209. INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, INCORPORATED, ANALYSIS OF DIESEL EMISSIONS IN THE 
U.S.-MEXICO BORDER REGION (Mar. 9, 2007). This report, prepared for the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency, documents the rise in truck emissions along the border resulting from 
NAFTA and other factors. 
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relatively low volumes of trade, trade in certain products may have a 
disproportionate environmental impact.  For example, increased trade in timber 
products from a country with few or small forests could generate 
environmental impacts greater than the volume of trade would suggest.  As 
such, these FTAs would benefit from a standing commission that identifies and 
evaluates environmental impacts resulting from the trade agreement. 
The second approach, used exclusively with the U.S.’s Latin American 
trading partners,210 establishes an Environment Affairs Council. These 
Councils are composed of cabinet level officials, although they do not need to 
be environment ministers.  In addition to providing opportunities for public 
participation, each Council is charged with overseeing implementation of the 
environmental provisions of the FTA, such as those on enforcement.211  In 
addition, they are responsible for developing an Environmental Cooperation 
Agreement (ECA), to elaborate on the role of environmental matters in the 
FTAs and create processes for the Parties to establish joint work programs to 
address conservation and other matters. 
The ECAs remain quite general and extremely similar concerning the types 
of projects to be undertaken, suggesting that little thought went into tailoring 
the ECAs to the specific environmental and institutional needs of the Parties.  
The ECA for DR-CAFTA, for example, calls for exchanges of delegations, 
professionals and others to strengthen environmental policies, as well as 
conferences and joint programs, the exchange of information, and the 
development and transfer of knowledge and technologies, among other 
things.212 
Each ECA also establishes an Environmental Cooperation Commission, 
composed of government representatives,213 responsible for developing 
cooperative environmental work programs.214  The provisions of the ECA get 
 
 210. DR-CAFTA, supra note 20, art. 17.5; U.S.-Chile FTA, art. 19.3; U.S.-Colombia FTA, 
supra note 21, art. 18.6; U.S.-Panama FTA, supra note 188, art. 17.6; U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 
22, art. 18.6. 
 211. DR-CAFTA, supra note 20, art. 17.5.2; U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 173, art. 19.3.1; 
U.S.-Colombia FTA, supra note 21, art. 18.6.2; U.S.-Panama FTA, supra note 188, art. 17.6.2; 
U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 22, art. 18.6.2. 
 212. Agreement among the Governments of Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and the United States of America on Environmental 
Cooperation, art. III, Feb. 18, 2005, available at http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/or/42423.htm 
[hereinafter DR-CAFTA ECA].  See U.S.-Chile Environmental Cooperation Agreement, June 17, 
2003, available at http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/or/43756.htm [hereinafter U.S.-Chile ECA]. 
 213. The DR-CAFTA and U.S.-Chile ECAs designate “high-level officials” from the 
Department of State as the U.S. representative.  The DR-CAFTA ECA designates officials from 
the party’s environmental ministry, whereas the U.S.-Chile ECA designates Chile’s Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs as the commission representatives.  DR-CAFTA ECA, supra note 212, arts. IV.2, 
IV.3.a; U.S.-Chile ECA, supra note 212, art. II.1. 
 214. DR-CAFTA ECA, supra note 212, art. V; U.S.-Chile ECA, supra note 212, art. II.2. 
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slightly more specific concerning the goals of the work programs.  The DR-
CAFTA ECA directs its Commission to create a work program designed to, 
among other things: (1) strengthen each Party’s environmental management 
systems, (2) develop and promote incentives for environmental protection, (3) 
conserve and manage shared, migratory and endangered species, and (4) build 
capacity to promote public participation.215  The U.S.-Chile ECA is even more 
general, providing that a subsequent work program must include activities to 
(1) collect and publish comparable information on each Party’s environmental 
legislation, indicators and enforcement activities, (2) exchange information on 
environmental laws and policies and implementation of multilateral 
environmental agreements, and (3) promote sustainable management 
practices.216 
At last, the work plans to implement the ECAs get specific.  For example, 
the 2006 DR-CAFTA work plan217 provided $250,000 for technical assistance 
to harmonize environmental regulations, implementing procedures and 
enforcement policies. The Parties allocated another $275,000 to improve 
implementation and enforcement of environmental law and $200,000 to 
strengthen environmental impact assessment of projects.218  Other projects are 
designed to improve natural resources management through ecotourism by 
eliminating barriers that prevent funds from reaching protected areas and 
promoting water conservation within the tourism industry, among other 
things.219  A project to encourage market and income incentives to promote 
sustainable development investigates the adoption of sustainable coffee and 
agricultural production practices.220  The 2005–2006 U.S.-Chile work program 
also provided for sharing best practices to promote and ensure compliance with 
environmental laws and regulations and capacity building for ecotourism, as 
well as consultations and exchanges concerning a range of topics within the 
scope of the ECA.221 
The DR-CAFTA ECA and work program bear one substantial 
improvement over the NAAEC.  Whereas the CEC’s budget has been forever 
 
 215. DR-CAFTA ECA, supra note 212, art. V.1. 
 216. U.S.-Chile ECA, supra note 212, art. III.2. 
 217. 2006 DR-CAFTA Environmental Cooperation Agreement Work Plan, available at 
http://www.marn.gob.gt/documentos/ccad/environmental.pdf.  See U.S. Department of State, DR-
CAFTA Labor and Environment Projects, (Sept. 28, 2006), available at http://www.state.gov/r/ 
pa/prs/ps/2006/73328.htm (describing 2006 projects); U.S. Department of State, DR-CAFTA 
Environmental Projects (Jan. 30, 2008), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/jan/99 
875.htm (describing 2007 projects). 
 218. Id. at 2–5. 
 219. Id. at 7. 
 220. Id. at 9–10. 
 221. U.S.-Chile Work Program 2005–2006, available at http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/or/ 
43756.htm. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2008] EVALUATING NAFTA AND THE CEC 243 
locked at $9 million,222 the DR-CAFTA budget for environmental projects was 
$18.5 million for 2006 and $19.3 million for 2007.223  However, the ECAs do 
not commit Parties to provide funding for the cooperative work program and 
instead make the work programs subject to availability of resources.224  To 
date, the United States has paid for activities under the cooperative work 
programs.225 
3. The Environmental Cooperation Agreements are Inadequate 
Despite increases in funding for environmental activities relative to the 
NAAEC’s budget, at least under DR-CAFTA, and projects designed to 
improve implementation and enforcement of environmental law, the ECAs are 
inadequate to address scale issues and the institutional needs of trading 
partners to cope with the environmental effects of trade-led growth.  As 
described above in Section III.A.2, perhaps the most important lesson from the 
NAFTA and NAAEC experience is that comprehensive and far-reaching 
environmental and development objectives must be established  and 
implemented before liberalizing trade. As explained, while NAFTA has 
increased trade among the Parties, increased growth—particularly in Mexico—
and promoted efficiencies in many natural resource-based economic sectors, 
those efficiency gains have not prevented pollution and resource use from 
increasing quite dramatically. Had institutions been prepared before 
liberalization, some of these problems could have been prevented.  By waiting 
until after the effects have occurred, the damage can only be controlled, not 
prevented.  The work plans of the ECAs are not being adopted, much less 
implemented, until well after the FTA requires trade barriers to be lowered or 
removed.  The DR-CAFTA Parties, for example, did not agree on a work plan 
until July 19, 2006, more than one year after DR-CAFTA entered into force for 
most Parties.226 
Moreover, without an independent Secretariat, no institution is charged 
with developing information about the environmental effects of trade.  As the 
 
 222. The NAAEC does not set the budget at $9 million.  Despite inflation and currency 
fluctuations, the CEC’s budget has remained at $9 million since the NAAEC’s entry into force. 
 223. See Press Release U.S. Department of State, U.S. Commits Funding For Labor and 
Environmental Protection for Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement 
Countries (Jan. 30, 2008), available at usembassy.or.cr/CAFTADR%20labor%20fact%20sheet% 
20CLEAN.pdf. 
 224. DR-CAFTA ECA, supra note 212, art. VIII.1 (providing that “All cooperative activities 
under the Agreement shall be subject to the availability of funds and of human and other 
resources, and to the applicable laws and regulations of the appropriate Parties.).  See U.S.-Chile 
ECA, supra note 212, art. VII.1. 
 225. See U.S. Commits Funding for Labor and Environmental Protection, supra note 223. 
 226. U.S. Department of State, Supporting Free Trade and Environmental Protection, 
http://www.state.gov/g/oes/env/trade/index.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2008). 
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history of the CEC shows, governments are all too willing to control 
information.  With an independent Secretariat, not only could such information 
be developed and published, but the independence of the Secretariat can shield 
controversial results from hostile governments.  This situation occurred when 
the CEC’s Secretariat initiated its study of the environmental effects of 
NAFTA227 and when it assessed the possible impacts of genetically modified 
corn on maize in Mexico.228 
V.  NEW DIRECTIONS FOR TRADE-ENVIRONMENT LINKAGES 
Before the United States and other countries negotiate new FTAs, they 
need to step back and learn the lessons of NAFTA and NAAEC for the design 
of environmental linkages in FTAs.  Because they are not doing that, they are 
failing to develop more effective ideas and institutions for improving trade-
environment linkages.  Building on the lessons of NAFTA and NAAEC, FTAs 
should concentrate on scale effects from trade-based growth, identify the 
institutional needs of trading partners both for addressing scale effects and in 
the larger environmental context, and commit to effective public participation 
and public oversight of trade-environment linkages. 
A. Focus on Scale Effects 
While future FTAs should continue to include provisions that prevent 
competitiveness effects, such as requirements to enforce environmental law 
effectively, they should make efforts to identify, prevent and mitigate scale 
effects.  As discussed in Section III.A, the work of the CEC and others has 
shown that scale effects are far more serious than competitiveness effects.  In 
particular, much more work is needed before an FTA enters into force to assess 
the impact of trade liberalization caused by specific economic sectors and, to 
the extent possible, in particular regions.  Moreover, once the FTA enters into 
 
 227. Block, supra note 46, at 522.  The CEC’s study of the environmental effects of trade 
provides one cogent example. Although Article 10(6) of the NAAEC requires the Parties to 
consider the environmental effects of NAFTA “on an ongoing basis,” the Secretariat has 
undertaken this work without the full support of the Parties.  As Greg Block writes: 
In furtherance of [Article 10(6)], the CEC Secretariat developed a framework for 
assessing the environmental impacts of free trade in the NAFTA region, held two public 
symposia to apply and refine the approach, and published numerous working papers and 
monographs on the subject. The project, initially clothed as an academic exercise focused 
on methodological issues, quietly evolved into a potent source of information on a diverse 
range of important issues. To date, the Secretariat has been able to pursue its publicly-
driven research agenda despite the reluctance and, earlier, outright hostility of some 
officials from trade and other departments. 
Id. at 521–522. 
 228. See Maize & Biodiversity, supra note 167, and accompanying text. 
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force, processes must be in place to monitor impacts and strategies (or 
obligations) agreed upon to mitigate them. 
A focus on scale will require a corresponding commitment to capacity 
building and obtaining relevant environmental data prior to entry into force of 
the FTA.229 Depending on the circumstances, capacity building may include 
information, technical training, technology or substitute products.230  Again, 
the CEC’s work shows that FTAs must invest far more in capacity building 
within regulatory agencies likely to be impacted by trade agreements to ensure 
that those agencies are able to monitor, assess, inspect, enforce and remediate 
environmental problems from increased trade.231 
This focus seems particularly relevant as FTAs reach areas of greater 
economic and other development needs.232  In fact, as the USTR said regarding 
DR-CAFTA, the Central American governments’ ability “to effectively 
implement and enforce environmental laws has been limited by the lack of 
fiscal and human resources.”233 We also know that the economies of 
 
 229. Capacity building “respond[s] to the specific lack of capacity to address a problem in a 
given circumstance with the necessary support.”  INDEPENDENT REVIEW COMMITTEE, supra note 
57, at 39. 
 230. Id. 
 231. A number of commentators have observed that the NAAEC should focus on capacity 
building.  See, e.g., id. at 38–40; Block, supra note 46, at 535.  It has begun to do so.  In the 
Puebla Declaration, which established the CEC Council’s vision for the CEC after the first 
decade of operations, the Council committed to capacity building, particularly in Mexico: 
We recognize the different capacities of the Parties and the continuing, urgent need to 
focus on institutional capacity building in order to sustain targeted results. We 
acknowledge that this is especially important for Mexico, and want the CEC to assist 
those concerned in the three countries—governments, the private sector, environmental 
organizations, academia, indigenous and local communities, and others—in gradually 
strengthening the capacity for sound environmental management across North America. 
CEC Council, Puebla Declaration (June 23, 2004), available at www.cec.org/files/PDF/ 
COUNCIL/Puebla-Declaration-2004_en.pdf. 
 232. Mexico, for example, is relatively wealthy compared with the countries in Central 
America. In 2005, Mexico’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (based on purchasing power parity 
(PPP)) of $1,094.3 billion, ranked twelfth among 180 countries.  Among DR-CAFTA countries, 
Guatemala, whose GDP (PPP) was $56.7 billion, is the wealthiest, ranked 72nd.  Costa Rica 
ranked 78th at $46.6 billion.  On a per capita basis, only Costa Rica compares favorably with 
Mexico.  Among 180 countries, the United States ranked fourth with a per capita income (PPP) in 
2005 of  $41,197.  Mexico and the DR-CAFTA countries had per capita incomes as follows: 
Mexico $10,615 (64), Costa Rica $10,773 (63), El Salvador $ 5,270 (101), Guatemala 4,133 
(114).  Nicaragua $3,685 (118), Honduras $2,983 (123).  International Monetary Fund, World 
Economic Outlook (2007), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2007/01/data/index.aspx  
(last visited Oct. 30, 2008).  See also Economic & Social Data Rankings, http://www.data 
ranking.com/table.cgi?LG=e&TP=ne03-2&RG=&FL= (last visited Oct. 30, 2008) (compiling the 
IMF’s data in an easy-to-use format). 
 233. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, FINAL REVIEW OF THE DOMINICAN 
REPUBLIC-CENTRAL AMERICA-UNITED STATES FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 10 (Feb. 22, 2005), 
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developing countries generally, and Latin American countries specifically, are 
resource based.234  Thus, we should expect effects in these countries similar to 
those in Mexico. Much greater funding and energy must be accorded to 
improving environmental infrastructure, including technical and legal 
capacities.235 
In addition, a greater emphasis must be placed on obtaining relevant 
environmental data before the FTA comes into force.  This is one area where 
the United States has clearly learned from the CEC, which has concluded that 
the “lack of high-quality environmental data hampers analysis of trade-
environment linkages.”  While some FTAs, including those in Latin America, 
are addressing the need for comparative environmental data in their ECAs or 
cooperative work programs, that information is coming after the impacts of 
FTAs come into force, thus eliminating the ability to gather baseline data for 
identifying the effects of trade. Without the relevant information prior to 
adoption of an FTA, it will be impossible to accurately assess the impacts of 
trade on the environment.  Future FTAs should ascertain the need for common 
units of measurement for environmental factors, such as reporting on releases 
of toxic chemicals. 
B. Identify Institutional and Other Needs 
If FTAs focus on anticipating scale effects prior to liberalizing trade, then 
they will be better able to anticipate and “either improve environmental laws, 
policies, infrastructure, and capacities, as a bulwark against unsustainable trade 
patterns, or intervene directly by promoting environmental measures that may 
affect trade.”236 While not necessarily adopting a focus on scale effects, the 
U.S.-Peru FTA does attempt to identify some of the legal, institutional and 
capacity building needs of Peru.  As such, it represents what is hopefully a new 
approach to trade and environment. 
The U.S.-Peru FTA is in many respects very similar to other FTAs. It 
adopts the basic NAAEC approach, which focuses on competitiveness effects 
and potential enforcement problems.237  However, it diverges significantly 
from the NAAEC approach by requiring substantial changes in Peru’s forestry 
 
available at www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Regional/CAFTA/asset_upload_file953_ 
7901.pdf. See also, Block, supra note 46, at 534. 
 234. See Block, supra note 46, at 532–535. 
 235. Id. at 535. 
 236. Id. at 520. 
 237. For example, it commits the Parties to “strive to ensure” that its environmental laws 
encourage high levels of environmental protection, to not fail to enforce its environmental laws, 
and to avoid weakening or reducing environmental protections to increase trade or attract 
investment.  U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 22, art. 18.1–18.3. 
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sector. It does so principally because of the high levels of illegal logging and 
trade, particularly in mahogany, in Peru.238 
As a result, environmental organizations successfully urged U.S. 
negotiators to include provisions in the U.S.-Peru FTA concerning forest 
management and trade in timber species. In an “Annex on Forest Sector 
Governance,” Peru is required to “increase the number and effectiveness of 
personnel” devoted to enforcing laws relating to timber harvesting and timber 
trade, including within national parks legislation and indigenous lands.239 Peru 
must also develop and implement an anti-corruption plan for officials charged 
with the administration of forest resources240 and increase criminal and civil 
penalties to levels that deter illegal activity.241 Moreover, Peru must improve 
implementation of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) by conducting comprehensive 
surveys of species protected by CITES, such as mahogany;242 establish export 
quotas for mahogany243 and  improve the administration and management of 
forest concessions by, among other things, physically inspecting areas 
designated for harvest of any CITES-listed tree species (i.e., mahogany);244 and 
develop systems to verify the legal chain of origin of CITES-listed tree 
species.245 
The demands on Peru do not stop here. For shipments of mahogany 
destined for the United States, the United States may ask Peru to investigate 
whether a particular Peruvian producer or exporter is in compliance with 
applicable laws; Peru is required to provide a written summary of its findings 
to the United States.246 With the consent of Peru, U.S. officials may participate 
in a site visit to determine a particular producer’s or exporter’s compliance 
with applicable law.247 
Beyond the provisions specific to the forestry sector, the U.S.-Peru FTA 
also establishes a Trade Capacity Building Committee to help the Parties, 
particularly Peru, make appropriate reforms to “foster trade-driven economic 
 
 238. Several organizations have documented illegal logging, inside national parks and 
indigenous reserves within Peru, logging in excess of harvest quotas, and trade in violation of 
Peru’s obligations under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild 
Fauna and Flora (CITES). See, e.g., Asociación Interétnica de Desarrollo de la Selva Peruana 
(The National Association of Amazon Indians in Peru), Illegal Logging and International Trade 
in Mahogany (Swietenia macrophylla) from the Peruvian Amazon (May 2007). 
 239. U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 22, Annex 18.3.4, ¶ 3(a). 
 240. Id. Annex 18.3.4, ¶ 3(a)(ii). 
 241. Id. Annex 18.3.4, ¶¶ (3)(b)–(c). 
 242. Id. Annex 18.3.4, ¶ 3(d). 
 243. Id. Annex 18.3.4, ¶ 3(f). 
 244. U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 22, Annex 18.3.4, ¶ 3(g). 
 245. Id. Annex 18.3.4, ¶ 3(h). 
 246. Id. Annex 18.3.4, ¶¶ 6, 7. 
 247. Id. Annex 18.3.4, ¶ 10. 
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growth, poverty reduction, and adjustment to liberalized trade.”248 This 
committee will, among other things, prioritize trade capacity building projects 
and monitor and assess progress in implementing trade capacity building 
projects.249 While this committee has no authority to make adjustments to the 
FTA where it identifies problems deriving from a lack of capacity, a permanent 
committee designed to assess capacity building needs is surely an important 
aspect of this FTA. 
These provisions are quite extraordinary and “groundbreaking”250—at least 
in the context of previous FTAs. In breaking the mold of FTAs, they point the 
way forward for future trade agreements by focusing the environmental 
provisions of trade agreements on problems likely to emerge or be exacerbated 
by liberalized trade. To the extent that these requirements fall short, it is that 
they must be adopted within eighteen months after, not at some time prior to, 
the date of entry into force of the FTA.251 Moreover, the FTA itself does not 
include any funding to help Peru implement these provisions. While the United 
States initially committed to funding implementation of the Annex on Forest 
Sector Governance, it now appears to be backing away from that pledge.252 In 
addition, it is not clear where the fund for the Trade Capacity Building 
Committee will come from.253 Without committed funding, these provisions 
may become nothing more than potential and promises unfilled, not unlike the 
NAAEC. 
 
 248. Id. ¶ 20.4.1. 
 249. U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 22, ¶ 20.4.3. 
 250. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Free Trade with Peru: Brief Summary of the 
United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, at 2 (June 2007) (describing the environmental 
provisions of the U.S.–Peru FTA), available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/ 
Peru_TPA/Section_Index.html. 
 251. U.S.-Peru FTA, supra note 22, Annex 18.3.4, ¶ 3. 
 252. Personal Interview with Kris Genovese, Attorney, Center for International 
Environmental Law (July 15, 2008). Ms. Genovese has been very active in efforts to reform 
Peru’s mahogany trade. 
 253. In a summary of the U.S.-Peru FTA, the United States acknowledged that it had 
provided substantial resources for capacity building in the past and that future funds “could” 
come from the World Bank and other sources: 
The U.S. Government provided a total of approximately $58 million in trade capacity 
building (TCB) assistance to Peru in fiscal years 2004 through 2006.  Peru also has 
benefited from U.S. government provided trade capacity building assistance to Andean 
regional programs, totaling more than $8.5 million for the same period.  Over the next 
five years, trade-related assistance to Peru that is under consideration by the Inter-
American Development Bank and the World Bank could total over $600 million in 
support of the agreement. 
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Free Trade with Peru: Detailed Brief Summary of the 
United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, 10 (June 2007), available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Peru_TPA/Section_Index.html. 
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C. Public Participation 
Whereas FTAs were once—and in some respects still remain—the 
province of secretive governmental meetings and dispute resolution processes, 
they have become much more open to public participation.  Indeed, regional 
FTAs have become essential promoters of public participation with all of the 
U.S. post-NAFTA FTAs, providing opportunities for public participation in 
environmental decisionmaking.  How they promote public participation can 
encourage an understanding of the environmental effects of FTAs. 
1. Environmental Review of FTAs 
As the CEC declared, “One of the strongest lessons of the CEC’s work in 
the area of environmental assessments of trade is that outcomes are stronger 
when the public is involved early, and involved often, in such assessments. 
Transparency in the process of debating trade-environment linkages invariably 
leads to stronger public policy outcomes.”254 Nevertheless, it is clear that a 
lack of transparency pervaded the DR-CAFTA negotiations in Central 
America, where, with the exception of Costa Rica, governments failed to make 
information on the FTA publicly available and excluded members of civil 
society from the negotiation process.255  FTAs should embrace a participatory 
and transparent approach to evaluating trade-and-environment linkages. 
2. Citizen Submission Process 
The citizen submission process must be rethought. As many have 
proposed, the easiest way to transform the citizen submission process would be 
to eliminate the governments’ role in determining whether a factual record is 
warranted.256  That simple change would help to ensure that process provides a 
valuable avenue for citizens of some countries to voice concerns about failures 
to enforce environmental law effectively.  However, it is clear that 
governments view the process as adversarial and litigation-based257 and are 
“more inclined to weaken the procedure rather than strengthen it.”258  As a 
consequence, they have made every effort to thwart its effectiveness; the 
 
 254. Vaughan & Block, supra note 104, at 27. 
 255. Claire Ribando, DR-CAFTA: Regional Issues 4 (CRS Report, Updated July 8, 2005). 
 256. See, e.g., Wold et al., supra note 17, at 40; Randy Christensen & Albert Koehl, NAFTA 
Needs Environmental Credibility, WINDSOR STAR, Mar. 8, 2008, available at http://www.eco 
justice.ca/media-centre/press-clips/nafta-needs-environmental-credibility; JPAC, Advice to 
Council: No. 01-07, Citizen Submissions on Enforcement Matters under Articles 14 & 15 of 
NAAEC, J/01-03/ADV/01-07/Rev.3 (Oct. 23, 2001); TRAC, supra note 102, at 54 
(recommending that Council “respect the role and authority of the executive director, in line with 
a strict interpretation of the [NAAEC]”). 
 257. See supra Section III.C. 
 258. Kal Raustiala, Citizens Submissions and Treaty Review in the NAAEC, in GREENING 
NAFTA, supra note 13, at 269. 
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process has clearly not lived up to expectations.  Given the history of 
repression in Central America, it is entirely predicable that no Central 
American person or organization has used the citizen submission process of 
DR-CAFTA.259  The entire model is wrong. 
Instead, future FTAs should design an approach that facilitates cooperation 
rather than encourages an adversarial process.  The members of the U.S. 
National Advisory Committee, which provides advice to the Environmental 
Protection Agency on issues relating to the NAAEC, recently proposed a non-
adversarial, cooperative mechanism for the resolution of environmental 
problems identified by citizens.260  This “problem-solving” process would 
allow citizens to approach an independent Secretariat with issues unrelated to 
enforcement failures and would not seek to assign blame for the specified 
environmental concern. Instead, the process would help resolve environmental 
problems: 
[T]he Secretariat would work with the requestors and the Party or Parties 
concerned to resolve the issue. The Secretariat’s functions would vary 
depending on the nature of the issue. It would seek to identify technology, 
information, financing, or other resources and catalyze resolution of the 
problem. (Those resources could be available through governments, 
businesses, academic institutions, non-profit institutions, international 
organizations, etc.)  In some cases, it might simply pass on such information to 
the requestors; in others, it might facilitate direct contacts between the 
requestors and other interested parties; in still others, it might prepare a short 
report outlining an approach that all interested parties might consider taking. 
Finally, in some cases it might determine after further consideration that it 
cannot assist with resolution of the problem.261 
At its core, this proposal attempts to address the central issues that matter 
to citizens: that their voices are heard and that officials respond to their 
concerns in a meaningful way. The proposal upends the nature of the citizen 
submission process by altering the nature of the process. Instead of an 
allegation that the government has failed to enforce environmental law, the 
process seeks ways to resolve specific environmental concerns. As such, the 
proposal would help renew the spirit of cooperation that has been lost in the 
NAAEC. 
 
 259. See supra Section IV.A.2. 
 260. Advice 2007-1, (May 24, 2007): Response to EPA’s request on potential projects for 
consideration by the CEC with emphasis on their relevance to U.S. audiences, in Letter from M. 
Dolores Wesson, Chair, National Advisory Committee, to Stephen Johnson, Administrator, U.S. 
EPA, at 13 (May 24, 2007), available at http://www.epa.gov/ocem/nac/pdf/2007_may24_nac_ 
letter.pdf.  This idea originated with Anne Perrault, Senior Attorney with the Center for 
International Environmental Law. 
 261. Id. 
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Another possible approach would focus the submission process on scale 
effects.  Under this approach, citizens could seek review of the effects of trade 
liberalization on the environment. As with Article 13 reports under the 
NAAEC, the Secretariat could assemble experts to ascertain whether the 
environmental impacts were, in fact, caused by trade.  If they were, then the 
Secretariat could propose measures, including recommendations for capacity 
building and technology, to mitigate those impacts. As with the previous 
proposal, this proposal seeks to eliminate the hostility that pervades the current 
submissions process by changing the focus of the process.  This proposal does 
not cast blame on any particular agency, official or company for environmental 
wrongdoing.  Rather, it asks whether a particular policy or measure is 
adversely affecting the environment. 
Whether either of these processes can transform a valuable avenue for 
citizen participation in environmental decisionmaking is unknown. An 
opportunity for citizens to focus on scale effects in a way that suggests trade 
may not be beneficial could in fact be more controversial than the current 
mechanism.  In any event, because the current process is clearly not working as 
intended, and with governments unwilling to let it work as intended, a new 
model should be tested. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
FTAs now promise more than economic growth derived from trade 
liberalization.  The public has come to expect that FTAs will also produce 
environmental benefits. Since the NAFTA negotiations culminated in the 
adoption of an environmental side agreement—the NAAEC—each subsequent 
FTA has adopted environmental provisions built on the NAAEC.  Yet, the 
NAAEC itself has sputtered, a victim of the very independence that Canada, 
Mexico and the United States expressly and tacitly gave it.  As a consequence, 
the United States has withdrawn many of the NAAEC’s essential aspects from 
subsequent FTAs.  Some FTAs, such as the FTAs with Australia, Morocco and 
Oman, do not include an environmental commission to coordinate 
environmental activities. Many do not include a citizen submissions process. 
None includes a quasi-independent Secretariat to evaluate issues within the 
scope of the work program. Even where the post-NAAEC FTAs do not 
fundamentally alter the framework included in the NAAEC—such as focusing 
on competitiveness effects and enforcement issues—the model itself is flawed 
and must be revisited. Without reorienting the environmental provisions of 
FTAs to focus on scale effects of trade liberalization, the post-NAAEC FTAs 
are unlikely to yield the environmental benefits many expect. 
The U.S.-Peru FTA provides a glimmer of the environmental benefits that 
FTAs could bring. In that FTA, negotiators assessed key weaknesses in Peru’s 
environmental institutions. Finding significant illegal logging and illegal trade 
in valuable timber species, particularly mahogany, the United States and Peru 
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negotiated provisions that require Peru to undertake substantial reforms in its 
forestry sector. These provisions are quite specific, calling on Peru to add 
enforcement personnel to its forest sector, increase sanctions for violations of 
relevant laws and even undertake surveys of timber species.262 
Still more needs to be done. To adequately take into account scale effects, 
provisions such as those included in the U.S.-Peru FTA should be implemented 
prior to the entry into force of the FTA, not after it.263  To encourage public 
participation so that citizens cannot only comment on potential environmental 
effects of trade agreements but also better understand the benefits of trade 
liberalization, governments must include citizens early in the process of 
assessing the environmental effects of trade.  Moreover, any citizen submission 
process should be rethought.264  Because the NAAEC’s focus on enforcement 
failures has put governments on the defensive, a process that encourages 
collaboration may provide more positive environmental outcomes than the 
NAAEC’s and DR-CAFTA’s citizen submission processes have. 
 
 
 262. See supra Section V.B. 
 263. See supra Section III.A.2. 
 264. See supra Section V.C.2. 
